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ARTICLES 
Deference Running Rfot: Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking Under Chevron 
MICHAEL HERZ* 
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC is 
only eight years old, yet it ha.s become perhaps the central case of mod-
ern administrative law. It is cited with extraordinary frequency,2 seems 
actually to be affecting lower court decisions3 (perhaps too much so), 
and has provoked intense debate over its meaning and correctness.4 
Chevron receives so much attention because it implicates the basic 
problems concerning the institutional roles of the different players in 
the administrative state. It is the decision in which the different ages of 
administrative law meet; the quasi-constitutional, structural issues that 
preoccupied early administrative law appear in the context of the 
* Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
I. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. A mid-January 1992 Lexis search of Shepard's Citations shows over 2000 cita-
tions to Chevron in the federal courts. 
3. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical 
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1028-43, 1058-59. Chev-
ron's effect on the Supreme Court has been inconsistent. Although the Court has taken 
Chevron seriously in occasional cases, overall it has shown no greater acceptance of 
agency interpretations than it had prior to that decision. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (l 992). 
4. The large and growing literature on Chevron falls into two basic camps: those 
who read it broadly and are pleased by its overall message of deference, and those who 
read it narrowly and are troubled by that message. The former includes, among others, 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administra-
tive Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 505-06, 520-24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defer-
ence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; and Kenneth W. 
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986). The 
latter includes, among others, Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 CO LUM. L. REV. 452 ( 1989), and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 
(1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism]. Professor Suristein's condemnation of 
Chevron has recently become a good deal less fierce. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
law and Administration]. 
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quasi-procedural, judicial oversight issues that have preoccupied later 
administrative law. 
For a century now, the courts have st'ruggled to determine the limits, 
if any, on what governmental tasks can be handed over to administra-
tive agencies. The Supreme Court has rarely held that those limits have 
been exceeded. In particular, apart from an occasional deviation," the 
Court has consistently upheld delegations of legislative authority.6 We 
are well past the point of serious constitutional challenges to broad 
delegations. What was once decried as "delegation running riot"7 has 
long been accepted as the proper, or at least inevitable, functioning of 
the modern administrative state.8 
In some ways Chevron is the Court's most honest decision about leg-
islative delegation, for it frankly recognizes that Congress does hand 
over largely unfettered policy-making authority to agencies.9 In the 
name of democracy, 10 it forbids judicial interference with an agency's 
exercise of delegated authority to fill gaps left by Congress.11 Chevron 
thus accepts the legitimacy of broad congressional delegation, and 
warns the courts that the delegation is not to them but to the demo-
5. See A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (hold-
ing unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to President under National Indus-
trial Recovery Act); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding un-
constitutional standardless delegation to President of power to interdict transportation 
of petroleum). 
6. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding dele-
gation of power to establish criminal sentences to United States Sentencing 
Commission). 
7. A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
8. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1947) (stating that 
judicial acceptance of vague delegations is "a reflection of the necessities of modern 
legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems"). 
9. The links between Chevron and nondelegation are explored in Douglas W. 
Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988). 
10. Many of the Court's recent decisions purport to advance the principle of demo-
cratic government. For a critical review of the Court's "majoritarian paradigm," under 
which the judiciary's essential task is to get out of the way of legislative majorities, see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 
(1989). 
11. Chevron divides review of agency statutory construction into two steps. "First, 
always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842. Where "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute." Id. Thus, where Congress "has explicitly left a gap for 
the agency to fill, ... [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843. Even 
where the gap is implicit, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. Id. 
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cratically acco.untable agencies. The substantial controversy surround-
ing Chevron concerns whether the decision does more than delegate 
power to the agencies. Its detractors portray Chevron as itself a delega-
tion, one that abandons to administrative agencies the judicial author-
ity and obligation to "say what the law is." 
In this Article I argue that both sides in the Chevron debate over-
state their case. Although my sympathies are with those who think 
Chevron goes too far, the opinion's basic conclusions are sound and 
must be taken seriously. On the other hand, courts too often carry def-
erence beyond its appropriate boundaries. Delegation inay have run 
riot, but deference should not, even in the name of respect for such 
delegations. . · 
Chevron creates two related risks that must inform its application. 
First, while Chevron presupposes and endorses broad legislative delega-
tions, it also undercuts their legitimacy. Historically, the acceptance of 
broad delegations has rested in part on the assumption that agency ac-
tion is subject to meaningful judicial review.12 To the extent Chevron is 
interpreted as letting the agency itself determine the consistency of its 
action with the terms of the delegation, it destroys this premise. Sec-
ond, while, as Chevron emphasizes, agencies have.an edge on courts in 
accountability, they have no such edge on Congress.13 To the contrary, 
12. See, e.g., Touby v. United States,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., concurring); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 
(1989); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1947); Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-46 (1932); 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(permitting delegations under "a principle of accountability under which the compati-
bility with the legislative design may be ascertained not only by Congress but by the 
courts and the public"); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (1989); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and 
Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 585-86 (1985). 
13. Emphasis on accountability as a characteristic of administrative agencies is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Agency officials are, of course, unelected. Oversight by 
the elected head of the executive branch is necessarily incomplete, and in certain per-
verse ways actually may reduce accountability. Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential 
Control of Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 456-57 (1987). Accord-
ingly, one of the primary objections to delegations of legislative authority is the lack of 
accountability of appointed officials. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (positing 
that first function of nondelegation doctrine is io "ensure[] ... that important choices 
of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive 
to the popular will"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-134 (1980) 
(arguing for reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine to ensure that policy is made by 
elected officials); CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL 2 (1988) (empha-
sizing need for congressional oversight); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. 
Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing 
for renewed nondelegation doctrine in order to prevent legislature from shifting its re-
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g1vmg agencies too free a hand trenches on congressional authority, 
thereby reducing accountability.14 To the extent Congress has in fact 
decided something, Chevron's own political theory requires the courts 
to ensure that agencies act consistently with that decision. 
The received lesson of Chevron-if the statute is unclear, uphold the 
agency unless the action is unreasonable-reflects insufficient aware-
ness of these risks. The basic error is a failure to distinguish agency 
interpretation, in a narrow sense, from agency lawmaking. Chevron 
does not make agency "interpretations" of statutes binding on the 
courts; it does require acceptance of agency lawmaking. Chevron is un-
derstood best in light of the longstanding, if OV\!rsimple, distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretive rules. Part I discusses this distinction 
and its application. Part II argues that the distinction remains alive 
and well, and that Chevron does not make agency interpretations in 
this strict sense binding, even where the statute is unclear. Part III 
addresses a ·series of simmering controversies about the scope of defer-
ence in light of the understanding of Chevron developed in Parts I and 
II. 
I. INTERPRETATION VERSUS LEGISLATION 
Separating interpretation from lawmaking is both easy and impossi-
ble. The two ought to be different: lawmaking is the process of devising 
and promulgating the rules; interpretation involves figuring out just 
what the rules mean, .often as applied to particular circumstances. Yet 
under almost any theory of statutory interpretation, 15 the two overlap. 
"Interpret_ation"-at least in any case where a statute is sufficiently 
unclear as to require judicial explication-must involve some extra-tex-
tual clues, even if merely "common sense" or the rules of grammar, as 
sponsibilities to agencies). Cf Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 
590 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that courts are more skeptical of retro-
active agency decisions than of retroactive legislation because "[t]he constitutional le-
gitimacy that inheres in Congress by virtue of its accountability to the electorate is 
absent" with regard to agencies, who "are not, as a practical matter, accountable to 
anyone and whose decisions are immune from challenge"). That concern should not be 
forgotten as a result of Chevron's false, or at least incomplete, dichotomy of judges 
versus agencies. • 
14. Or at least that is the theory of our Constitution. Whether it squares with polit-
ical reality is a more difficult question. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Ad-
ministrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985) 
(arguing that agencies are more accountable than Congress). 
15. Recent years have seen an explosion of such theories. For a brief catalogue, see 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Sca/ia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1614-15 (1991). 
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to the "better" of two or more possible readings.16 It also is likely to 
involve the application of statutory language to unanticipated situa-
tions, which will require elements of "lawmaking" as just defined.17 
Despite pleas for judges who will "interpret and not make the law,"18 
they do not really exist. 
Nonetheless, administrative law doctrine insists that the two tasks 
are different, hence the distinction between legislative and interpretive 
rules. This distinction helps define the appropriate limits of Chevron. 
A. Interpretive and Legislative Rules 
The black-letter principles are easily stated. A legislative, or substan-
tive, 19 rule has the "force and effec~ of law."20 The rule itself is the 
"primary source of legal obligation,"21 creating new law, rights, or du-
ties.22 An interpretive rule, in contrast, merely states the agency's view 
16. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTER-
PRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 739 (1982); Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, 
Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, I I CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1211 (1990). 
17. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Inteht and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 423, 457-58 (1988). 
18. In announcing his nomination of Justice Souter, for example, President Bush 
assured an anxious nation that the nominee "is committed to interpreting, not making 
the law." Comments by President On His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
1990, at A18, col. 1. In the ensuing question and answer period, he reiterated six sepa-
rate times that he had sought and was confident he had found a nominee who would 
"interpret the Constitution" rather than "legislate from the bench." Id. President Bush 
was following a long tradition. See HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESI-
DENTS 4 (1976) (describing similar assurances by President Nixon on nominating Chief 
Justice Burger). See also American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith,_ U.S._, 110 S. Ct. 
2323, 2343 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "the judicial role ... is to say 
what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be"); The Federalist Society (3d unnum-
bered page) (describing Federalist Society as founded on principle that "it is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should 
be"). 
19. The two terms are generally used interchangeably. See Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (referring to "a substantive rule-or a 'legislative-
type' rule"); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) · (referring to 
"[l]egislative, or substantive, regulations"); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 180-81 (3d ed. 1991); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30, n.3 (1947) (using term "sub-
stantive rules"). I will stick with "legislative." See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:9, at 45-48 (2d ed. 1979) (stating that "legislative rules" is 
preferable term because "substantive" means "nonprocedural"). 
20. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,. 425 n.9 (1977); Paul v. United States, 371 
U.S. 245, 255 (1963); Smith v. Russelville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1985); WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 151 
(1986); SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 181. 
21. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979). 
22. General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
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of what the statute already requires.23 The statute remains the basis for 
any legal obligations or the imposition of liability, and the rule only 
clarifies or draws attention to the statutory requirements. 24 This dis-
tinction is not crystal clear,2 e1 and often evaporates in the application; 
nevertheless, it is conceptually coherent and doctrinally entrenched. 
A second, slightly less common, line is sometimes drawn between 
·legislative and interpretive rules; only legislative rules are adopted pur-
suant to a specific delegation of rulemaking authority. 26 Thus, an 
agency rule that fleshes out a statutory term establishing legal obliga-
tions, which is interpretive under the approach outlined above, is legis-
lative if Congress has specifically instructed the agency to issue such 
rules, even though, for example, the agency could bring an enforcement 
action with or without promulgating the rule. Perhaps the best-known 
such case is Batterton v. Francis. 27 In Batterton, the statute specifically 
instruct.ed the agency to issue standards that would further define the 
statutory term, "unemployment." The Court treated these rules as leg-
islative even though issuance of the rules was unnecessary to the opera-
tion of the statute.28 Batterton has been criticized as blurring the dis-
tinction between legislative and interpretive rules.29 Certainly the type 
of rule to which it accords legislative effect often will be interpretive in 
the sense of explaining or clarifying statutory rights or duties. By virtue 
of the congressional delegation, however, such rules have the force of 
law so they are legislative rules. 
Whether a rule is legislative or interpretive matters for two reasons. 
First, the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) do not apply to interpretive rules. 30 Second, and 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 {1985). 
23. id. 
24. Friedrich v. Secretary of HHS, 894 F.2d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 1990); Board of 
Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979). 
25. The District of Columbia Circuit has described it as "enshrouded in considera-
ble smog." Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. 
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that "attempts to draw a hard 
and fast tine between 'interpretive' and 'substantive' regulations have been rather 
unrewarding"). 
26. K.C. Davis is the leading exponent of this view. 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, at 
§ 7:8. 
27. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). 
28. Id. at 425. The same approach occurs in, among other cases, United States v. 
Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 {1983); 
Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 
U.S. 607 (1944); Wint v. Yeutter, 902 F.2d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
29. Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis 
and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 353 .. 
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) {1988). 
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more important for present purposes, interpretive rules receive "less 
deference" on judicial review;31 unlike legislative rules, they are not 
"binding."32 Interpretive rules are, in the oft-quoted passage from Jus-
tice Jackson's opinion in Skidmore,33 "not controlling upon the courts," 
although they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 34 
The respect owed by a court to such an interpretation "will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all of those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control."35 Thus, "[a]lthough nonlegislative rules have no binding 
force, they are usually given considerable deference."36 In contrast, leg-
islative rules bind not only the regulated community and the agency 
itself, but the courts as well.37 A reviewing court can set aside a legisla-
tive rule only if it exceeds the agency's statutory authority or is arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.38 In other words, courts scrutinize legislative rules under the 
Chevron step two approach.39 
B. The Scope of Defe,:ence 
Its defects notwithstanding, the traditional interpretive/legislative 
distinction is the best guide through the Chevron thicket. It separates 
two different, if occasionally overlapping, determinations: what an 
agency thinks Congress decided, on the one hand, and what an agency 
would decide on its own, on the other. There are sound reasons why an 
agency's interpretive determinations (its conclusion as to statutory 
meaning) should not be binding, but its legislative, or policy-based, de-
terminations should be binding. 
31. Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1983). 
32. Seneca Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384, 1396 (Temp. Emerg. 
Ct. App. 1983); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
33. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
34 Id. at 140. 
35. Id.; see Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) ("By way of con-
trast [to judicial treatment of legislative rules], a court is not required to give effect to 
an interpretative regulation."). 
36. CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 3.53, at 93 (1990 
Supp.); see 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, at§ 7:13 (discussing deference given to interpretive 
rules by courts). 
37. 2 DAVIS, supra note 19, § 7:10, at 52. 
38. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977). 
39. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing Chevron's two-step ap-
proach to reviewing agency statutory construction). 
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1. Why Defer? 
To understand why interpretations should not be binding, it is neces-
sary to consider the basic justifications for judicial deference to agen-
cies.40 The justifications fall into two broad categories, reflecting the 
different ways in which an agency may have a comparative advantage 
over a court in dealing with a statute. First, the agency's proximity to 
the legislative process may give it special insight into congressional in-
tent.41 Second, the agency's expertise and political accountability may 
make it a preferable body for the formulation of policy.42 These two 
advantages argue for different kinds of review. 
The most obvious explanation for deference to agency interpretations 
would be that the agency is better able to understand the statute than 
is the court. The agency may have helped draft the statute;43 it may 
possess an institutional memory about the statute's history and true 
meaning; it is better informed of Congress' current views; and, in light 
of its technical expertise and complete familiarity with the statute,44 it 
can determine the interpretation that will be most workable in practice 
and best advance the statute's overall goals.45 In these ways, the agency 
interpretation can be trusted to comport with congressional will and 
statutory purposes, which the agency understands better than the court. 
Although this justification for deference has a lengthy pedigree, it is 
not the theory that underlies Chevron. In Chevron, the Court deferred 
not because it deemed the agency to have a superior understanding of 
the statute, but because there was nothing to understand. Congress had 
left a "gap" for the agency to fill, thereby implicitly instructing the 
courts to accept the agency's decision.46 Chevron assumes that Con-
40. Similar summaries of the justifications for deference can be found in, among 
other sources, STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 253-56, and Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial 
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 AoMIN. L. REV. 363, 367-69 (1986). 
41. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (explaining reasons for deference 
to agency interpretations). · 
42. See infra notes 46-49, 56 and accompanying text (detailing Chevron's justifica-
tion for deference). 
43. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 (1979) (confirming that "[a]dminis-
trative interpretations are especially persuasive where, as here, the agency participated 
in developing the provision"); Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 315 (1943) (up-
holding agencies' interpretation because agencies "cooperated in developing the Act, 
and their views are entitled to great weight in its interpretation"); United States v. 
American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) ("[T]he Commission's interpreta-
tion gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which sug-
gested the provisions' enactment to Congress."). 
44. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
45. Breyer, supra note 40, at 368. 
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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gress does not know exactly what it wants but trusts the agency.47 
Under this now common view of the theoretical underpinning of judi-
cial deference, 48 the need for and extent of deference is a function of 
congressional intent.49 
The notion that Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the 
agency is likely to be wholly fictional in any case where the delegation 
is not express. The rivalry between the legislative and executive 
branches, compounded by the now longstanding phenomenon of powers 
separated not only by the Constitution but by political party, should 
raise doubts that Congress actually wants to hand over power to the 
agencies. 5° Congress should prefer relatively stringent judicial review of 
agency interpretations.51 Chevron's presumption is particularly 
47. Breyer, supra note 40, at 369-71. 
48. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,_ U.S _, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 
(1991) ("When Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of an inter-
pretive gap in the statutory structure, has delegated policy making authority to an 
administrative agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy determina-
tion is limited."); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,_ U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 1384, 1390-91 
(1990) (" A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority."); Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 
(7th Cir. 1987) ("If the legislation either calls for the agency's decision or contains no 
disposition of the subject, then the agency has been deputized to make a rule, and its 
decision should be respected."); STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 285-86 (2d ed. 1985); Robert A. 
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. 
ON REG., 1 (1990); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 570 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the 
Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 n.184 (1983); Scalia, supra note 4, at 
516-17. 
One other justification for deference bears mention. Because federal agencies have a 
nationwide jurisdiction and federal courts •Of appeals do not, greater judicial deference 
will lend uniformity to federal law. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersec-
tion of Law & Po/icy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990); Peter L. Strauss, One 
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited 
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 
(1987). This justification has nothing to do with whether the agency's view is "correct"; 
it merely reflects that the easiest way to achieve uniformity is for the 800 federal 
judges to agree to go along with the one agency. 
49. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 694 
F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (explaining that "[t]he extent to which 
courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is ultimately 'a function of Con-
gress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular statutory scheme at issue' " 
(quoting Constance v. Secretary of HHS, 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982))). 
50. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the 
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (1990). See 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (requiring that in reviewing agency action "court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law ... [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions") 
(emphases added). 
51. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 1026 (arguing that "[i]f courts are suspi-
cious of agency power, their mistrust only mirrors that of members of Congress and the 
general public"); id. at 1027 (noting Congress' preference for judicial review with 
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counterfactual in equating ambiguity with delegation.62 Statutory am-
biguity results primarily from time constraints, logrolling, and individ-
ual legislator's desire for credit but not blame. As Justice Stevens was. 
fully aware, it is not necessarily the result of a conscious desire of Con-
gress to leave policy-making to the agency.63 The Court nonetheless 
indulged the fiction because of its belief in the democratic accountabil-
ity of agencies. Judges "are not part of either political branch"64 and 
"have no constituency";66 therefore they should yield to agencies' reso-
lution of the policy questions that Congress left undecided.66 
2. Deference to What? 
The foregoing rationales justify deference to two very different types 
of agency conclusions. Although the term "interpretation" is applied to 
both, they roughly correspond to the interpretive rule/legislative rule 
distinction. The first rationale-agencies' superior understanding of 
statutory meaning-concerns "interpretation" in a strict sense; the elu-
cidation or. translation of a statutory term. The agency is in a particu-
larly good position to determine what Congress meant. That is the sort 
of conclusion set out in interpretive rules. In contrast, the second justifi-
cation-agencies' superior accountability and· political legitimacy-is 
not so· much about "interpretation" as it is about lawmaking. The 
agency is in a particularly good position to determine not what rule 
Congress prescribed but which rule is best. Chevron deference does not 
reflect the agency's ability to determine the one correct meaning of a 
statute. Rather, its premise is that no such thing exists. The agency is 
teeth). 
52. Farina, supra note 4, at 468-76; Michael Herz, Textua!ism and Taboo: Inter-
pretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1666-68 
(1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 407, 445 ( 1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting] ( objecting that "an ambigu-
ity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two."). 
53. Justice Stevens did not claim_ that Congress consciously desired to let the 
agency answer the hard questions; his point was that, whatever the explanation, that is 
what Congress had done: 
Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at 
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibil-
ity for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps 
it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was 
unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side 
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial 
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
54. Id. at 865. 
55. Id. at 866. 
56. Id. 
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not clarifying Congress' decision, it is making the decision itself. 
Whether by congressional direction, superior accountability, or techni-
cal expertise, such lawmaking, holds Chevron, must be left to the 
agency. 57 
The difference is illustrated by the still hardy principle that a long-
standing agency "interpretation" is due particular deference.58 Such 
enhanced deference is justified primarily on the ground that Congress' 
apparent acceptance of the interpretation over the years shows that the 
agency is "correct."59 Accordingly, deference is heightened even fur-
ther if Congress has amended the relevant or a related statute but left 
the portion at issue unchanged60 or if the interpretation dates from the 
statute's enactment, when the agency supposedly was most aware of 
what Congress had in mind.61 The particular authority of the unwaver-
ing interpretation thus lies in its consistency with congressional intent.62 
. . 
57. The national uniformity justification is of the .second type; it has nothing to do 
with whether the agency interpretation is "correct." Nonetheless, it justifies no more 
than the deference historically accorded interpretive rules. First, a lack of national uni-
formity, which is tolerated in a wide variety of settings, is simply no_t a sufficiently 
compelling reason to abandon the traditional and necessary role of the courts in insist-
ing that agencies adhere to Congress' decisions. Second, if national uniformity is the 
goal, that can be achieved equally well by having any subsequent court defer to the 
first court to decide an issue, an approach no more inconsistent with traditional as-
sumptions than having it defer to the agency. Third, national uniformity will still be 
promoted, though not guaranteed, by the courts granting Skidmore deference to 
agency interpretations. Finally, the geographical uniformity produced by Chevron is 
offset by a loss of temporal and interagency uniformity. The freedom agencies enjoy 
under Chevron to change their views, see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text, will 
lead to inconsistency over time and between agencies with costs that may be significant. 
See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in 
the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 817-20 (1991) (describing inconsistencies 
in diverse agencies' implementation of similar statutory schemes). 
58. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) 
(observing that "construction deserves special deference when it has remained constant 
over a long period of time"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 
(1978) (commenting that "longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is 
entitled to considerable weight"). 
' 59. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States~ 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (re-
marking that since Congress has corrected misconstructions of statutes by agencies in 
past, its failure to modify Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings of which it was defi-
nitely aware "leave[s] no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercis-
ing its authority"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1969) 
(deferring because Congress refused to alter FCC's fairness doctrine for thirty years 
and then explicitly acknowledged it in statutory amendment). 
60. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Com-
missioner, 350 U.S. 46, 53 (1955). 
61. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 120 
(1980); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978); National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. United States Merit Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895, 917 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
62. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (observing that "con-
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In contrast, if Congress has turned over the policy-making task to the 
agency, then an ancient "interpretation" should carry virtually the 
same weight as the most recent of a series of agency reversals.63 In-
deed, a constantly shifting policy may indicate that the agency is doing 
its job, reflecting the expertise, accountability, and flexibility that justi-
fied placing the decision in its hands. The regulation challenged in 
Chevron was itself a Reagan administration reversal of the positi<;m 
taken by the Carter Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that 
many would justify in these terms.64 The important point is that be-
cause in such circumstances the agency's view is not in fact an "inter-
pretation" of a statute, its vintage is irrelevant to its validity. 
Although courts, including the Supreme Court, still reflexively recite 
the principle that longstanding interpretations deserve special defer-
ence,615 Chevron clearly reflects the second of these approaches.66 The 
gressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's [longstanding] interpretation is per-
suasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress") (emphasis 
added). Thus, Judge Posner, operating from the premise that the interpretive task is to 
determine the enacting legislature's intent, argues that courts should defer only to long-
standing interpretations. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM 280 (1985). 
63. I say "virtually" because deference to a longstanding interpretation can also be 
justified on the ground that reversal will upset settled expectations. This has nothing to 
do with the interpretation's consistency with congressional intent. Rather, an unsup-
ported change in policy may so harm reliance interests as to render the change arbi-
trary and capricious, part of the Chevron step two inquiry. Similarly, a shift occurring 
without any explanation would not be upheld. For example, the air bags case, Motor 
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), involved 
no question of interpretation whatsoever; the matter of pure policy was in the hands of 
the agency. Nonetheless, an unjustified shift doomed the agency action. Cf Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that 
secondary retroactive impact of formally prospective regulation may be so severe as to 
render regulation arbitrary and capricious). 
64. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
65. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., _ U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535 
(1991) (stating that Department of Labor's interpretation pursuant to express congres-
.sional delegation would merit less deference had it been inconsistent with previously 
held views); Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that great deference is given to consistent and longstanding agency interpretations); 
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating 
that less deference is due to an agency's position that is inconsistent with a prior con-
sistently held agency view). 
Invocation of this principle is not always reflexive. The Third Circuit, for example, 
recently came to the considered and express conclusion that examination of agency 
consistency is part of the step two inquiry. NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 936 
F.2d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1991). This holding is flatly wrong. See infra note 66 and 
accompanying text (discussing deference to longstanding interpretations). 
66. "Chevron made crystal clear that an agency interpreting a statute under an 
express or implied delegation of authority is free to modify its view." Federal Labor 
Relations Authority v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446,. 1455 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). Accord Rust v. Sullivan,_ U.S._, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991) (stating 
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opm1on rests on the premise that Congress did not decide whether a 
plant-wide bubble could render new source requirements inapplicable. 
Rather, Congress created what Peter Strauss has labeled a "zone of 
indeterminacy,"67 in which the agency was free to do what it wanted as 
long as it did not go off the deep end. Judicial review of the bubble 
policy had nothing to do with a determination of congressional intent; 
there was no intent to determine. Chevron is about legislative rather 
than interpretive rules. 
What "binds" a court, then, under both the traditional interpretive/ 
legislative rule distinction and under Chevron, is not agency interpreta-
tion but agency legislation-the adoption of a particular policy within 
the boundaries established by the statute.68 So viewed, Chevron im-
poses exactly the scheme Professor Monaghan had set out the year 
before.69 Monaghan argued that in light of Congress' broad legislative 
delegations the judicial function is only to determine what authority 
has been conferred upon the agency. "Judicial deference to agency 'in-
terpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of 
law making authority to an agency."70 Where an agency acts pursuant 
to delegated legislative authority, the task of interpretation is merely to 
define the boundaries of the zone of indeterminacy. 
that as long as agency supports new interpretation with "reasoned analysis," even sharp 
break from prior position merits full Chevron deference); Starr, supra note 4, at 297-
98; Strauss, supra note 48, at 1125-26. , 
The same idea underlies the courts' appropriate willingness to accept conflicting 
agency interpretations of the same term in different sections of the same statute. Ab-
bott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Comite Pro Rescate v. Sewer 
Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,_ U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 1476 
(1990). 
67. Strauss, supra note 48, at 1124. See id. at 1121 {using phrase "range of inde-
terminacy"); id, at 1123 (using phrase "area of indeterminacy"), 
68. Concededly, the Chevron opinion refers repeatedly to "an agency's construction 
of the statute," "an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme," and 
"deference to administrative interpretations," concluding that "the Administrator's in-
terpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests 
and is entitled to deference." Chevron, 467 U,S. at 842, 844, 865 (emphasis added). 
These references to "interpretation" and "construction" reflect a different usage than 
mine, not a different meaning. The structure and basic rationale of the opinion indicate 
that the Court is deferring not to the agency's reading of the Clean Air Act, but to its 
lawmaking pursuant to congressional delegation. Thus, the Court pescribes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) as "an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities," Id. at 865, The Court concludes "that the EPA's use of 
the bubble concept is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make." Id. at 845. 
The lawsuit, "fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's pol-
icy." Id. at 866. The Court's emphasis on democratic theory and ,the inappropriateness 
of judicial policy-making underlines its view that the case presented no issue of statu-
tory construction but merely a policy choice. Id, 
69. Monaghan, supra note 48. 
70. Id. at 26. 
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Consider the purest examples of legislative rules: health, safety, or 
environmental standards. For example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA 
establishes national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for cer-
tain ubiquitous air pollutants.71 These are legislative rules by any defi-
nition; they create binding legal duties where none had existed before 
and are promulgated pursuant to express congressional delegation. A 
"primary" NAAQS must be set at the level that ensures, with an ade-
quate margin of safety, protection of the public health.72 Armed with 
this delegation, EPA promulgated an ambient standard for ozone of 
0.12 parts per million (ppm).73 Industrial and environmental interests 
both sought judicial review, the former saying the number was too low, 
the latter that it was too high. The court reviewed the standard to de-
termine whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law. Not surprisingly, it upheld the 
regulation.74 
Although the vocabulary seems incongruous, this was a. classic Chev-
ron step two case. Congress expressly delegated legislative authority to 
EPA; the zone of indeterminacy is defined by statutory language re-
quiring protection of the public health. The 0.12 ppm standard is ac-
ceptable, but given the scope of the delegation and the uncertainty of 
the science a court also would have upheld a standard half or twice the 
one EPA promulgated. The bubble policy, or any other agency deter-
mination properly evaluated under Chevron step two, is just like the 
NAAQS-a legislative, policy-based decision that binds the courts, 
whose only function is to ensure that the rule is within the scope of the 
delegated authority and not arbitrary. The scope of review is narrow 
not because the court must accept the agency's interpretation, but be-
cause there is so little to interpret. 
3. Binding Interpretations 
Chevron is silent as to how a court should treat an agency's interpre-
tation of Congress' decision. As discussed in Part II.B, such an inter-
pretation should be, as interpretive rules always have been, influential 
but not binding.75 Suppose, however, that Congress·expressly has given 
71. 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (1988). 
72. Id. § 7409(b)(l). 
73. 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979), codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1991). 
74. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(upholding standards because they were not arbitrary and capricious and were "sup-
ported by a rational basis in the record"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1034 (1982). 
75. As the Court said only the term before, "[w]hen an agency's decision is pre-
mised on its understanding of a specific congressional intent ... it engages in the 
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an agency binding interpretive authority. Here, step two is appropri-
ate.76 Such cases involve legislative rules; the agency functions under 
an express delegation to promulgate binding regulations with the force 
of law even though they may be interpretations in the strict sense of 
expressing a congressional decision.77 
Congress does have the authority to grant agencies such interpretive 
authority. The courts' traditional role is indisputably reduced where the 
agency rather than the court makes a conclusive determination of stat-
utory meaning. However, this does not amount to an unconstitutional 
creation of Article II courts78 or a contraction of the federal "arising-
under" jurisdiction.79 Nor is this an unconstitutional delegation. It is 
true that in such circumstances not only does Congress hand over legis-
lative authority to an agency guided by only the vaguest "intelligible 
principle,"80 but the agency itself determines what that principle is.81 
quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute means. In that case, the 
agency's interpretation, particularly to the extent it rests on factual premises within its 
expertise, may be influential, but it cannot bind a court." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
& Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983). Nothing in 
Chevron is to the contrary. 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) (holding that 
because "Congress explicitly delegated authority to construe the statute by regulation, 
in this case we must give the regulations legislative and hence controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute"); Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (holding that Secretary of Health and Human Services 
has authority to establish administrative guidelines for determination of total disability 
and judicial review "is limited to determining whether the regulations promulgated ... 
are arbitrary and capricious"); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) 
(limiting review of regulation to reasonableness standard because of express delega-
tion); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (holding that where Congress 
has expressly delegated to agency authority to prescribe by regulation what constitutes 
"unemployment" under statute, courts can set aside regulations only if they exceed 
agency's authority or are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion). 
77. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between 
legislative and interpretive rules). 
78. The argument would be that the judicial function, saying what the law is, is 
being handed over to the agency, which renders binding, final rulings. 
79. In a sense, for Congress to grant binding interpretive authority to agencies 
removes certain federal questions from judicial purview. This argument fails for two 
reasons. First, Congress can, to a much-debated extent, define the federal judicial 
power more narrowly than does Article III. See generally Kevin T. Worthen, Shedding 
New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional 
Authority to Limit Federal Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 69-81 (1990) (discuss-
ing theories under which Congress may restrict federal courts' jurisdiction). Second, a 
court's determination that the statute makes the agency interpretation dispositive is 
itself an exercise of the "arising-under" jurisdiction. 
80. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hamp-
ton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
81. The possible unconstitutionality of this lack of congressional control depends on 
one's view of the core problem with standardless delegations. If the problem is that 
Congress must make the decisions, then it is highly questionable to allow an agency to 
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Yet here a greater-includes-the-lesser argument, usually problematic 
with regard to separation of powers,82 is perfectly valid. If Congress 
can hand over legislative authority altogether, it surely can make an 
initial attempt at legislation and then assign an agency the task of fig:-
uring out what it did, subject to judicial review to ensure that the 
agency's conclusion is "permissible. "83 
Although Congress can grant and has granted such interpretive au-
thority to agencies, there is no justification for establishing a back-
ground or default rule to that effect. It is one thing to say, as Chevron 
does, that Congress implicitly delegates to agencies the authority to 
make policy-based rules within statutorily defined limits, although even 
that is a bit of a stretch.84 But it is perverse to assume that Congress 
also gives agencies binding authority to determine what it is that Con-
gress has done. Not only is such an idea inconsistent with the tradi-
tional roles of courts, Congress, and agencies, it also undercuts Con-
gress' assumption that its action~ will control unless and until a 
subsequent Congress makes changes. Laws survive the political coali-
tions that produced them; the legitimacy of a statute does not depend 
on current public or congressional opinion.85 Under the accountability 
rationale of Chevron, this is a reason for placing primary interpretive 
authority with the courts rather than with the agencies. The political 
determine the limits on its own authority. If, on the other hand, the concern is that 
agencies not act with complete discretion in individual cases, then the agency can ade-
quately tie its own hands through rulemaking and the nondelegation problem is not 
increased. 
82. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rejecting argument that 
because Congress creates and can eliminate executive branch offices it can remove of-
ficeholders);· INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54 (1983) (rejecting argument that, 
because Congress can hand over decision to Attorney General entirely, it can hand it 
over subject to legislative veto); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976) (conclud-
ing that Congress' power to create and eliminate executive branch offices does not 
mean that Congress can appoint officeholders). 
83. A recent article argues that Chevron's grant of binding interpretive authority to 
agencies is unconstitutional. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 57. For the reasons I 
have sketched out, I disagree, although the argument deserves fuller treatment than I 
have given it. It bears emphasis, however, that the constitutionality of Chevron defer-
ence is even open to question only in this setting, i.e., where the agency is interpreting 
rather than legislating. A true gap-filling, legislative, step-two setting raises no con-
cerns about encroachment of judicial authority, but only a garden-variety nondelega-
tion issue. Professor Caust-Ellenbogen and I would agree, I think, that courts are often 
too quick to consider cases under step two when they really do present an interpretive 
question for judicial resolution. 
84. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why Con-
gress should prefer stringent judicial review of agency interpretations). 
85. See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 308-09 (1989) 
(arguing that even radical changes in public opinion do not justify deviations from 
statutory directives). 
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result reflected in the statute more likely will be respected by neutral 
courts than. by · accountable, politically appointed agencies. Congres-
sional silence should, therefore, be understood to leave this power-the 
power to say what it is that Congress has done-with the courts, where 
it has always been. 
Indeed, it is illogical to read Chevron as establishing that an agency's 
understanding of what Congress has done is controlling. The court 
must at least determine that Congress has given such instructions. That 
determination is necessarily a determination of congressional intent. It 
would be extraordina·ry for a court not only to deem an agency's inter-
pretations binding, but also to deem the agency's view that its interpre-
tations are binding as binding. At a minimum, the court must make the 
latter determination.86 
II. CONFRONTING AMBIGUITY IN STEP ONE. 
If Chevron is a revolutionary case, what makes it so is its apparent 
hospitality to implied delegations generally, and delegations by ambigu-
ity in particular. If mere ambiguity counts as a delegation, then agency 
rules that are interpretive in the sense of merely delineating what Con-
gress has decided become binding on the courts despite the absence of 
express delegation. Chevron then would have eliminated the category of 
interpretive rules, with "the power to persuade, if lacking the power to 
control,"87 and made Skidmore historical curiosity. A statute either is 
clear and therefore agency interpretations are irrelevant, or it is un-
86. The point resembles a common refutation of John Marshall's reliance in Mar-
bury on the proposition that the power of judicial review derives from the judiciary's 
duty to "say what the law is." The Court might, in doing so, say that the Constitution 
grants Congress the authority to determine the constitutionality of its own enactments. 
That conclusion would itself be an interpretation of the Constitution. David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-
1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 658 n.77 (1982); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29. Similarly, a court must inter-
pret the statute to determine if it gives the agency interpretive authority. 
Professor Anthony, who seems to have no quarrel with Chevron generally, invokes 
Marbury and speaks of the "abdication of judicial duties" in arguing that no more 
than Skidmore deference should apply when a court reviews an interpretive rule. 
Anthony, supra note 48, at 57. The reliance on Marbury seems somewhat misplaced, 
for if Congress has clearly rendered agency interpretations binding, the court is still 
saying what the Jaw is in determining that Congress has done so. Monaghan, supra 
note 48, at 26-27; see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing deference 
due when Congress has expressly granted interpretive authority to agency). Professor 
Anthony is on solid ground, however, in invoking the courts' traditional role of inter-
preting congressional intent absent a clear showing that Congress has displaced them 
with an administrative agency. 
87. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see supra notes 31-36 and 
accompanying text (discussing standard of review of interpretive rules). 
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clear and agency interpretations are binding. 
Under this strong reading of Chevron, step one cases would be both 
utterly straightforward and few and far between. In practice, however, 
the Supreme Court seems to have decided statutory cases on its own, 
within step one, even where it would be hard to say that Congress truly 
has spoken to the precise question at issue.88 Under the reading of-
Chevron advocated in this Article, the Court has not in fact been back-
. sliding. Rather, these cases reflect the fact that in some settings there is 
room for argument about the proper in~erpretation of a statute but the 
question remains one of statutory meaning, not pure policy. For all the 
traditional reasons, an agency's views will be relevant but not binding 
in answering the question. In short, there is a role for Skidmore defer-
ence within step one. 
The Court's treatment of this question has been inconsistent. At 
times it suggests that Skidmore is a dead letter,. at other times it ritu-
ally invokes the Skidmore factors. I argue that a mere lack of clarity is 
not a delegation and reports of Skidmore's death are greatly 
exaggerated. 
A. Types of Ambiguity 
Justice Scalia has stated that "the chink in Chevron's armor-the 
ambiguity that prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to fu-
ture judicial decisions"89-is uncertainty as to what it takes to move 
from step one to step two. "How ,elear is clear?"90 If there is an express 
delegation of legislative authority, this problem does not arise. It is in~ 
escapable, however, in deciding whether to proceed to step two because 
the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue."91 
Courts should not equate a mere lack of clarity with a delegation of 
decision-making authority to the agency.92 Congress is ·rarely crystal 
clear, and courts resolve statutory ambiguities all the time. Indeed, it is 
88. See generally Merrill, supra note 3, at 990-93, 1000-03 (describing Court's 
"reformulation" of step one inquiry to allow judicial resolution whenever statute has 
plain, or clearly preferred, meaning). 
89. Scalia, supra note 4, at 520. 
90. Id. 
91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
92. The temptation to do so is great. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reading "the ambiguities and perplexities of 
the statute as delegating to the agency a broad interpretive authority"); see also Sun-
stein, Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 467 (stating that "[a]lthough the Chevron 
rule of deference is appropriate when Congress purposely has left a gap for agency 
resolution, a different rule should apply when there is merely ambiguity"); sources 
cited at supra note 52. 
1992] DEFERENCE RUNNING RIOT 205 
when Congress is ambiguous that judicial review is arguably most im-
portant, for there is the greatest danger that an agency will misread 
congressional intent. 
At what point a statute becomes so ambiguous as to be a delegation 
is difficult to quantify. In fact, most efforts to do so sound quite a bit 
alike. For example, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens have issued op-
posing warnings about under-stating or over-stating Chevron's reach. 
Fearing too narrow a reading of Chevron, Justice Scalia stresse$ that it 
is not necessary for opposing arguments to be in "absolute equipoise" 
for the necessary ambiguity to exist.93 Fearing too broad a reading, 
Justice Stevens warns that "[t]he task of interpreting a statute requires 
more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative 
deference."94 I suspect that neither Justice would disagree with the 
other's admonition at this level of generality and abstraction. Similarly, 
although their views of Chevron are fundamentally different, I doubt 
that Justice Scalia would disagree with Professor Sunstein that "[i]f 
the court has a firm eonviction that the agency interpretation viola,tes 
the statute, that interpretation must fail."96 In the application, how-
ever, disagreement reigns as to the clarity of particular statutes. Not 
surprisingly, since Chevron, where some Justices find clarity others dis-
cover ambiguity, and that disagreement in turn determines how they 
would decide the case.96 Of course, the cynic would suggest the reverse 
sequence; that the Justices decide on an outcome, which in turn deter-
mines whether they find (or label) the statute clear or ambiguous. 
Whether Chevron, or any legal doctrine, constrains anything but 
judges' vocabulary is a question for another day. 
If one is to search for verbal formulations of the extent of ambiguity 
that triggers step two, Professor Sunstein's seems as good as any. But 
93. Scalia, supra note 4, at 520. 
94. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
95. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at 2092. 
96. See Rust v. Sullivan,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767~69 (1991) (upholding 
regulation as permissible interpretation of ambiguous statute); id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (finding statute clear and agency's interpretation inconsistent with it); Sulli-
van v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990) (upholding regulations as permissible interpreta-
tion of statute, which had not spoken directly to issue); id. at 973 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (contending that regulations violated congressional intent that was "clear beyond 
peradventure"); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990) (finding defe~-
ence inappropriate because "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' inten-
tion"); id. at 43 (White, J.; dissenting) (contending that statute was not clear and 
therefore deference was due); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (setting aside 
regulation as manifestly contrary to statute); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that regulation must be upheld as permissible interpretation of unclear 
statute). 
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no such formulation will ever be sufficient to overcome the blind spots 
or disingenuousness of individual judges. There will always be cases 
where only some judges find the statute ambiguous,97 or where all 
agree it is pellucid, but disagree as to its indisputable meaning.98 The 
situation resembles the application of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
to district court findings of fact, from which Professor Sunstein borrows 
his "firm conviction" test.99 Just what is "clearly erroneous" is difficult 
to quantify; there is no significant disagreement at the most abstract 
level, yet results will vary from judge to judge. The quantity of ambi-
guity simply cannot be defined usefully in the abstract. 
Ambiguity varies not only quantitatively, but qualitatively as well, 
and it is the qualitative difference that really matters. Consider the 
well-known case of Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,100 in 
which the Court upheld the view of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services that he had discretion as to whether to issue certain 
regulations. The statute required the Secretary to "promulgate regula-
tions limiting the quantity of [poisonous or deleterious substances in or 
on food] to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of pub-
lic health."101 The Secretary contended that "to such extent as he finds 
necessary" qualified his duty to promulgate regulations.102 The District 
of Columbia Circuit held that it qualified only the "limiting the quan-
tity" phrase, thus obligating the Secretary to regulate all poisonous 
substances but leaving him discretion in determining allowable 
97. Dissenting judges often accuse the majority of inventing an ambiguity in order 
to defer and avoid the merits altogether. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition 
Inst., 476 U:S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 
F.2d 984, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
98. In Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990), for example, a majority of 
seven Justices held that the statute unambiguously confirmed the agency's interpreta-
tion; the dissenters argued that it unambiguously contradicted the agency. See also 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, _U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992) (de-
ciding case under Chevron's step one and rejecting government's position); id. at 834-
40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with government's p9sition, but relying directly 
on statute rather than on principle of deference). The Court was split even more se-
verely in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988). Justice Kennedy's opinion 
upheld the regulation as a permissible interpretation of a vague statute. Justice Bren-
nan found that the statute was clear and compelled the agency's interpretation. Justice 
Scalia found that the statute was clear and contradicted the agency's interpretation. 
99. FED. R. C1v. P. 52(a). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
100. 476 U.S. 974 (1986). 
101. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1988). 
102. Young, 476 U.S. at 979. 
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amounts.103 The Supreme Court found the statute ambiguous and the 
agency's interpretation permissible; it reversed the circuit court under 
Chevron's step two.104 
The decision in Young prompted a fierce dissent from Justice Ste-
vens1011 and has been roundly condemned by academic commentary.106 
The usual criticism is that the statute simply was not sufficiently am-
biguous to merit blind acceptance of the agency's interpretation. The 
real defect in the opinion is slightly different, however .. It is a function 
of the type rather than the amount of ambiguity. Justice O'Connor 
states that Congress "was speaking directly to the precise question at 
issue" but failed "unambiguously [to] express[] its intent through its 
choice of statutory language."107 If Congress has spoken to the issue, 
however, Chevron deference is inappropriate notwithstanding ambigu-
ity. In such circumstances, unlike in Chevron, Congress did have an 
intent, which binds both the court and the agency. One of the reasons 
we have courts to interpret statutes is because Congress is often un-
clear. There is no delegation to the agency in this setting; the only 
question is what Congress meant. As we have seen, that question is for 
judicial resolution.108 
In sum, Congress might mean to express something but do so ambig-
uously, or it might be ambiguous because it meoot to express nothing. 
Chevron's step two should apply only in the second situation, which is 
what Chevron itself involved. 
103. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
rev'd, 476 U.S. 974 (1986). 
104. Young, 476 U.S. at 974. 
105. Young, 476 U.S. at 988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The task of interpreting a 
statute requires more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking· administrative 
deference."). 
106. See Farina, supra note 4, at 462 ("Young graphically demonstrates the ex-
tremism of which the new deference is capable."); S.idney A. Shapiro & Robert L. 
Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administra-
tive Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 859 (stating that Young indicates Court's "presumption 
of ambiguity"); Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 466-67 & nn.205, 208. 
107. Young, 476 U.S. at 980 (emphasis added). 
108. The distinction might be stated as being between "vagueness" and "ambigu-
ity." As described by Professors Eskridge and Frickey, "[a]mbiguity creates an 'either/ 
or' situation, while vagueness creates a variety of possible meanings." WILLIAM N. Es-
KRIDGE, JR. & PHILIPP. fRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 839 (1988). Under this formulation, the statute 
in Young was ambiguous but it was not vague. The Chevron opinion, like almost all 
later commentary, uses the term "ambiguous," but under this formulation it commands 
deference only when the statute is "vague." 
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B. Deference Within Step One 
The Court has given confusing signals about the role of Skidmore 
deference in the post-Chevron era. On the one hand, it has not forgot-
ten the Skidmore factors. In Cardoza-Fonseca, for example, it seemed 
to work the Skidmore approach into the Chevron framework. Explicitly 
operating within step one, Justice Stevens noted that the weight of the 
agency's interpretation was diminished because it had been inconsistent 
over the years. 100 The Court has also indicated that consistency is rele-
vant in evaluating an agency's interpretation under step two. 11° Fur-
thermore, in a recent case involving EEOC interpretive bulletins, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion relied on Skidmore and did not 
cite Chevron,m suggesting that there are sjtuations where Skidmore 
applies that fall altogether outside the Chevron framework. On the 
other hand, most deference opinions no longer cite Skidmore. Indeed, 
Justice Scalia has pronounced Skidmore dead: "In an era when our 
treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron, the 'legislative 
rul~s vs. other action' dichotomy ... is an anachronism."112 
Skidmore deference might seem wholly out of place after Chev-
ron.113 The Skidmore factors, which go to the likelihood that the 
agency's interpretation accurately reflects congressional intent, clearly 
have no place in step two cases. 114 Skidmore could be relevant under 
step one precisely because there the issue is congressional intent. Yet 
under the usual understanding of step one cases, Skidmore deference 
would be superfluous. In step one, the statute alone provides the an-
swer; the statute is so clear that resort to the agency for guidance is, by 
definition, unnecessary. In this view, deference is all or nothing;115 ei-
109. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987). 
110. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535 
(1991). 
111. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S._·_, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991). 
The EEOC took the position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000(a)-(h)(6) (1988), applies to American companies operating abroad. The Court 
ruled that Title VII applies only within the United States. ' -
112. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
113. Justice Scalia views all .regulations as meriting full Chevron deference and 
rejects the idea that some have "only the power to persuade." Id. See also Schuck & 
Elliott, supra note 3, at 1024 (stating that Chevron "[s]wept aside all of these [Skid-
more] criteria for determining the extent of deference in favor of a dramatic reformu-
lation of the grounds for deferring to agency constructions of statutes"). 
114. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining that consistency of 
agency's position is irrelevant under Chevron). 
115. Strictly speaking, to defer means to accept another's decision or authority. 
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 263 · (1942) (defining "defer" as "[t]o yield or 
submit to the opinion or wishes of another, or to authority"). In the context of judicial 
"deference" to agency interpretations, however, courts use the term to mean "respect" 
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ther agency interpretations control or they are irrelevant. 
I have tried to show, however, that there is a class of 
cases-including, but not limited to, review of interpretive 
rules-where Congress has not delegated either the interpretive or the 
legislative task to the agency. The court remains the primary inter-
preter, and the question is one of statutory meaning, not one of raw 
policy. The statute is not necessarily crystal clear in these cases. Within 
step one, the court seeks to determine the meaning of the statute; for 
all the traditional reasons116 the agency's view may be helpful in doing 
so. In fact, the Chevron opinion supports the continuing role of Skid-
more deference. Within step one, the court attempts to determine con-
gressional intent "employing the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion;"117 one of those tools, of course, is the interpretation of the agency 
charged with administering the statute. 118 
C. Are There Interpretive Rules After Chevron? 
The traditional principles concerning judicial review of interpretive 
rules survive Chevron. Interpretations in rules fall into three categories: 
rules that volunteer the agency's understanding of the statute; rules 
that explain the statute pursuant to an express delegation of interpre-
tive authority; and interpretations that underlie, but are not stated in, 
legislative rules. Review under st~p two is appropriate only with regard 
or "weight." Hence the frequent references to degrees of deference. See, e.g., Board of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981) 
(holding that Board deserved "greatest" deference); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (giving varying weight to agency views according to 
importance of expertise); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (noting that degree of deference is not uniform). See also Scalia, supra note 
4, at 514 (explaining that "[t]he mealy-mouthed word 'deference' does not necessarily 
mean anything more than considering those views with attentiveness and profound re-
spect, before we reject them"). 
It has been argued that Chevron "modif[ies]" the traditional judicial usage, redefin-
ing "deference"' to mean controlling weight. Starr, supra note 4, at 296. But see 
Strauss, supra note 48, at 1126 (Chevron step two requires something more than "def-
erence"). As I discuss, the principle of varying degrees of deference survives Chevron. 
116. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for 
deference where court's task is to determine statutory meaning). 
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
118. Strauss, supra note 48, at 1125. "Like the testimony of involved executive 
branch officials .at congressional hearings or the initial interpretations given a statute by 
the responsible agency, an agency interpretation that has remained constant over the 
years can plausibly be regarded as evidence of what is assumed to be a determinate 
congressional meaning, one to be found out by the courts." Id. (footnotes omitted). See 
Willam V. Luneburg, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Construction: An Introduc-
tion, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 243, 250 (1988) (stating that Skidmore deference is "presumably" 
still applicable within step one). 
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to the second category. 
I. Traditional Interpretive Rules 
The traditional understanding of interpretive rules is that they ex-
plain what Congress has decided. By definition, therefore, review of an 
interpretive rule must belong in step one. With the notable exception of 
Justice Scalia, 119 no court or commentator has explicitly stated that 
Chevron eliminates the old rule that interpretive rules are not bind-
ing.120 Nonetheless, numerous decisions have, without discussion, up-
held interpretive rules under Chevron step two.121 One author has de-
119. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 
(I 991) (Scalia, J ., concurring) (rejecting any distinction between deference owed legis-
lative rules and that owed other agency actions). , 
120. For example, in the 1990 Supplement to his horn book, Professor Koch states: 
The idea that the effect of a validly promulgated rule on the courts is governed 
by the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules has become so 
strongly established that it may be one of the few "black letter" laws in adminis-
trative law. The difference in effect on the courts is immense. 
Because they are made pursuant to delegated authority, legislative rules have 
the force of law and a court may test them only for arbitrariness. Whereas, [a] 
nonlegislative rule, the result of no such delegation, may be subjected to agree-
ment (de novo) review. 
1 KocH, supra note 36, at 41 (citations and footnotes omitted). Similarly, Professors 
Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil, enthusiastic supporters of Chevron, also endorse a less 
deferential approach to interpretive rules. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, 
& PAUL R. VERKUJL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 310 (1985). They comment 
approvingly on a court decision suggesting that an agency conclusion struck down in 
the form of an interpretive rule might be upheld as part of a legislative rule. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914,917,923 {D.C. Cir. 
1991); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1327 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fidelity 
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990); National Recycling 
Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 884 F.2d 1431, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Guadamuz v. Bowen, 
859 F.2d 762, 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1988); Samaritan Health Serv. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 
1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hicks v. Cantrell, 803 F.2d 789, 792 ( 4th Cir. 1986); 
Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 
1986), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole,784 F.2d 1118, 
1125 (D.C. Cir. 1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, 778 F.2d 850, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1985); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 
742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 
(1985). See also Public Employee Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 182 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (invoking Chevron where majority had rejected agency's in-
terpretive regulation as being simply inconsistent with statute); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 
935 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding Chevron applicable to review of interpretive 
rule but setting rule aside under step one); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 
437 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that new EPA interpretation set out in n:iailgram was 
ripe for review in part because it would command Chevron deference from court and 
therefore had significant legal effect). . 
Some courts have stated that interpretive rules are not binding, like legislative rules, 
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scribed the result as the creation of a class of "interpretative rules with 
legislative effect." 122 
Under the traditional understanding of interpretative rules as merely 
a clarification of congressional action, these decisions are plainly incor-
rect. An interpretive rule by definition adds nothing to what Congress 
has done. Where the agency issues an interpretive rule, then, congres-
sional intent is necessarily discernable. Yet Chevron concerns those sit-
uations where Congress is silent and without intent. By its riature, an 
interpretive rule is subject to step one review, for the basic idea is that 
rather than delegating the decision to the agency, Congress has made 
the decision which the agency is explicating. On the other hand, if 
Congress has not acted, as in Chevron itself, then the rule cannot be 
but nonetheless merit Chevron deference. Rodlin v. Secretary of HHS, 750 F. Supp. 
146, 150 (D.N.J. 1990). There is not really space in the taxonomy for such a category. 
I know of only one decision that expressly finds Chevron inapplicable to interpretive as 
opposed to legislative rules. See Capitano v. Secretary of HHS, 732 F.2d 1066, 1076 
(2d Cir. 1984) (opinion on denial of rehearing) (rejecting agency's interpretation as 
inconsistent with statute and noting that Chevron does not "change this result since we 
do not have a legislative regulation here"). 
The Supreme Court has been unclear. The Court implicitly held Chevron inapplica-
ble to interpretive rules in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., _ U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 
1227 (1991) (citing Skidmore but not Chevron in rejecting view of statute set out in 
EEOC interpretive bulletin); but see id. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (according 
EEOC interpretation full Chevron deference), and explicitly declared Chevron inappli-
cable in dictum in Martin v. OSHRC, _U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1179 (1991) 
(stating that interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines are "entitled to some weight 
on judicial review" but not "to the same deference as norms that derive from the exer-
cise of ... delegated lawmaking powers"). 
122. Saunders, supra note 29. Saunders argues that such weight should be ac-
corded only to interpretive rules that have undergone notice and comment. Id. at 371-
82. This is the most recent variation on a longstanding strain of both judicial opinion 
and academic commentary arguing th~t any rule with a substantial impact requires 
notice and comment. See Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (holding that whether rule is substantive, and 
therefore subject to APA notice and comment requirements, turns on whether it will 
have substantial impact on substantive rights and interests); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary 
of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that "[b]y virtue of this sub-
stantial impact both upon the aliens and their employers, notice and opportunity for 
comment by the public should first be provided"); William T. Mayton, A Concept of a 
Rule and the "Substantial Impact" Test in Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L.J. 889, 898-99 
(1984) (arguing that agency action, having "palpable effect" across segment of society 
should be subject to notice and comment); Ricki Rhodarmer Tigert, Note, A Func-
tional Approach to the Application of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 430, 432-33 (1976) (arguing 
that agencies should provide notice and comment when doing so will protect private 
interests and serve informed policy-making). This approach is on the wane in the fed-
eral courts. See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ameri-
can Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982); see generally Kath-
leen Taylor, Note, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the Fallout from Vermont 
Yankee?, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 118 (1985) (concluding that most circuits have re-
jected substantial impact test in light of Vermont Yankee). 
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classified as interpretive because there is nothing to interpret. With re-
gard to agency interpretations in this sense, then, Chevron by its terms 
does not make agency conclusions binding. 
2. Express Delegations of Interpretive Authority 
Congress may expressly delegate what seems under the above stan-
dard to be "interpretive" authority. Interpretations made pursuant to 
express legislative delegation should be reviewed under step two. Such 
rules, of course, would n9t be deemed interpretive rules precisely be-
cause of the delegation.123 Such delegation must be express. 
3. Interpretations that Underlie Legislative Rules 
This leaves a third category of interpretations: those that underlie 
but are not stated in legislative mles. Consider the NAAQS again. In 
implementing the statutory directive to establish safe levels of air pollu-
tion, EPA promulgates a rule that is little more than a number identi-
fying the acceptable concentration of a specific pollutant.124 A review-
ing court plainly cannot substitute its judgment for the agency's as to 
the appropriate concentration. In that sense the rule is "binding" on 
the courts. The standard itself-the actual number-is of course not a 
binding interpretation, but is based on certain interpretations. For ex-
ample, to develo;, a primary NAAQS, .EPA must first decide who con~ 
stitutes the "public" whose health is to be protected. Must the standard 
be set at the level where the average adult is unaffected? The average 
child? Asthmatics? The single most sensitive individual? Whether this 
is a question of interpretation depends on whether there is anything to 
interpret. Congress might have left this question to the agency, al-
though it is the sort of basic policy question one would expect Congress 
to decide. The legislative history indicates that Congress viewed the 
"public" as the most sensitive group, 125 and EPA has so read the .Act. 
The fact that this interpretation of the term "public" was the predicate 
for a h:;gislative rule should not mean that it binds the courts under 
Chevron. As an interpretation, it merits Skidmore deference but no 
more, and that is what it has received.126 
123. See Wint v. Yeutter, 902 F.2d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that Chevron 
step two applies "given Congress's explicit delegation to the USDA of the authority to 
define, not merely to apply, the terms in question"). 
124. See 40 C.F.R. part 50 (1991) (setting out National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS)). · 
125. S. REP. No. I 196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). 
126. See Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding 
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Yet Chevron's strong message of judicial deference is taken to apply 
with full force to agency-interpretations contained in legislative rules. 
Professor Anthony writes: 
Interpretations are often expressed through the exercise of the agency's statuto-
rily-delegated authority to make law in the form of rules. Interpretations set 
forth in this format possess the fullest credentials to command judicial accept-
ance. They are "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute."127 
To the extent Anthony is discussing situations where there was an ex-
press delegation of interpretive authority, I agree. If the suggestion is 
that, for example, the statutory interpretations that underlie a rule 
such as the NAAQS are also binding, I disagree. 
Assume for now that "interpretations" within legislative rules receive 
full Chevron respect, but those set out in interpretive rules do not. 128 
This distinction is not self-evident. One would think that an _interpreta-
tion is an interpretation. If deference is really to vary with the setting, 
so that in some cases the ultimate interpretive task is the court's and in 
others it is the agency's, some relevant differences between the settings 
must be identified. 
One difference between interpretive and legislative rules is that only 
the latter are the result of notice and comment rulemaking. 120 One 
could argue that only rules that result from public scrutiny and discus-
sion merit full deference. This reasoning resonates with cases and com-
mentary requiring or suggesting notice and comment procedures even 
for interpretive rules if they have a substantial impact130 and with Con-
gress' original rationale for excluding interpretive rules from notice and 
comment requirements. 131 Such a link between full procedures and def-
erence might also underlie the Supreme Court's rule that agency liti-
gating positions do not merit full Chevron deference.132 However, this 
NAAQS for lead), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). 
127. Anthony, supra note 48, at 44 (quoting Chevron). Professor Anthony also 
states that the fact that a legislative rule embodies a statutory interpretation does not 
mean it carries any less force. Id. at n.205. 
128. That deference should vary with format is the central argument of Anthony, 
supra note 48. 
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A), (d)(2) (1988). 
130. See supra note 122 (discussing view that any rule having substantial impact 
requires notice and comment). 
131. The Senate Report accompanying the Administrative Procedure Act explained 
that notice and comment was unnecessary for interpretive rules because these 
"rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judi-
cial review." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946). 
132. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2414 n.3 (1991) 
(White, J., concurring); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 
(1988). The Supreme Court also hinted that procedural fullness should bear on 
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difference is inadequate to justify giving controlling weight to interpre-
tations embodied in legislative rules but not those in interpretive rules. 
Notice and comment followed by arbitrary and capricious review is 
not the equivalent of de novo judicial review without notice and com-
ment. First, notice and comment proceedings are typically geared more 
to full development of policy concerns than legal issues. Second, even if 
statutory ambiguities are fully discussed in the comments, when Chev-
ron applies, the agency knows that the courts will uphold any "permis-
sible" interpretation. A private party attacking the agency's interpreta-
tion is in a weaker position submitting comments to an agency that 
knows its interpretation will control, than making legal arguments to a 
court under a de novo standard, even without notice and comment. Full 
public discussion does not replace meaningful judicial review, for the 
lack of meaningful judicial review largely undercuts the value of the 
discussion, at least on legal issues. The second argument for reduced 
deference to interpretations contained in interpretive rules is that Con-
gress has not delegated to the agency authority to make binding inter-
pretations in this format. 133 This is a stronger theoretical argument; it 
identifies a coherent reason for accepting the agency's interpretation in 
one setting and not the other. The problem lies in finding some indica-
tion that Congress wants interpretations underlying legislative rules to 
be binding, but does not have such an intent with regard to interpretive 
rules. One might argue that because interpretive rules have never been 
deemed binding, Congress must have legislated with this understand-
ing. It therefore presumably intends interpretive rules, but only such 
rules, not to be binding unless it indicates to the contrary. This back-
ground rule only gets us so far. First, it rests on a speculative and he-
roic assumption about Congress' understanding of the doctrinal frame-
work of judicial review of agency action. Second, a delegation to write 
legislative rules is not in itself a delegation to make binding interpreta-
tions of the statute, as the NAAQS example illustrates. Third, there is 
simply no reason to think that Congress might actually want the 
agency interpretations to be binding if they underlie legislative rules, 
but not otherwise. 
Finally, even if setting does matter in theory, it may make little 
practical difference. Professor Anthony posits the situation where an 
whether a rule binds the courts in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983). There it stated that an FLRA 
"Interpretation and Guidance" document might carry controlling weight because, 
among other things, it "was attended by at least some of the procedural characteristics 
of a rulemaking." Id. 
133. For an extended statement of this argument, see Anthony, supra note 48. 
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agency possesses the authority to interpret with the force of law, 
through a legislative rule, but thus far has expressed its interpretation 
only informally. If that interpretation becomes subject to direct review 
before the agency has taken concrete action based upon it, the court 
should not be able to intercept the agency's delegated interpretive au-
thority by taking advantage of the as yet non-legislative status of the 
agency interpretation and telling the agency what definitive view to 
adopt. The court should merely decide whether the interpretation is in-
valid on its face, a quasi-step two inquiry, leaving the agency "untram-
meled in its freedom to choose a position anywhere within the zone of 
indeterminacy."134 If the underlying distinction is correct, this is a nec-
essary refinement. If the agency has primary interpretive authority, 
then it would contravene congressional ~ntent and the allocation of re-
sponsibility to deprive the agency of such authority by a quirk of tim-
ing. It is, however, a rather large exception that eliminates the sup-
posed critical importance of format. Under this approach, if the agency 
lacks authority to issue binding legislative rules, then there has not 
been the subject matter delegation that must exist to proceed to Chev-
ron's second step. This fact alone is enough to keep the court in step 
one, regardless of the format of the agency interpretation. If, on the 
other hand, the agency possesses such aut_hority, then the court is una-
ble to construe the statute independently even though the format is 
non binding. 
In short, there is no strong reason for saying that interpretations in 
an interpretive rule have different force than interpretations underlying 
a legislative rule. If I am right that interpretive rules should not be 
binding, 135 then it follows that interpretations found in legislative ·rules 
should not be binding either. Indeed, as I have defined "interpreta-
tions"-agency views of congressional meaning-there is no reason 
they should be. The difference in judicial deference to legislative and 
interpretive rules rests on a difference in the relation of these agency 
determinations to the statute. To the extent the rule, whether interpre-
tive or legislative, rests on, or can be meaningfully reviewed under, the 
statute, no more than Skidmore deference is appropriate. To the extent 
the agency is operating within a discretionary zone established by Con-
134. Id. at 41-42. The same position is taken in Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 
F.2d 1325, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that when "dealing with an ambiguous term 
... a court should not interpose its own interpretation of the term before the agency 
has an opportunity to consider the issue and fix on its own statutory construction") 
(emphasis in original). 
135. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing-review of interpre-
tive rules under step one of Chevron). 
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gress, and therefore not "interpreting" the statute, step two applies.136 
III. APPLYING. CHEVRON 
All Chevron questions reduce to one question: d9es the statute pro-
vide an answer? All efforts to limit Chevron-it should not apply to 
pure questions of law, it should not apply to interpretive rules, it should 
not apply to an agency's determination of its jurisdiction or the scope of 
its authority, it should not apply unless the statute is very ambiguous, it 
should not apply unless and until the court has derived all it can from 
the statute--are different formulations of one idea. The court must fol-
low the statute before it follows the agency. 
To say that the courts must ensure that agencies adhere to what 
Congress has decided is not a stunning new insight; that much is clear 
on the face of the Chevron opinion. But it is a less trivial point than it 
seems. Chevron stands as a constant invitation to ignore what Congress 
has decided because it did not decide, in the unfortunate language of 
the Chevron opinion, "the precise question at issue." 137 The remainder 
of this Article examines these temptations in certain illustrative and 
controversial settings to identify just when step two kicks in and when 
it does not. 
A. Agencies' Interpretations of Their Own Authority 
Many commentators have tripped over the fact that Chevron seems 
to allow agencies to determine the scope of their own authority. 138 The 
136. The distinction I have in mind is discussed by Judge Posner: 
Often when there are political pressures to do something about a problem but 
the legislature cannot agree exactly what to do about it, it will pass a statute the 
effect (as well as the undisclosed purpose) of which is to dump the problem in 
the lap of the courts, taking advantage of the fact that the courts are a kind of 
political lightning rod. But this implies that the courts are expected to try to 
solve the problem; they have a mandate, though no specific directions. So unless 
this mode of legislation is thought to be unconstitutional, the courts have a duty 
and not merely a power to solve the problem in a reasonable way. This is inven-
tion rather than discovery; it is "interpretation" only in a special sense .... 
POSNER, supra note 62, at 290. Substitute "agencies" for "the courts" in the foregoing 
and you have the Chevron problem. To the extent Congress has dumped the problem in 
the agency's lap, what the agency is doing is "'interpretation' only in a special sense," 
id., and step two applies. Even there, however, the court must (1) determine on its own 
whether Congress has done so and (2) enforce those decisions Congress can fairly be 
said to have made. 
137. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 843 n.9. 
138. See Anthony, supra note 48, at 54-55 (stating that "one may wonder whether 
Chevron will enduringly displace the deeply-rooted doctrine that an 'agency may not 
finally decide the limits of its statut0ry power. That is a judicial function.'" (quoting 
Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946))); Shapiro & Glicksman, supra 
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issue was disputed in the Supreme Court in Mississippi Power & Light 
Co. v. Mississippi. 139 Justice Scalia argued that it is "settled law" that 
Chevron's deference principle applies with full force to jurisdictional 
issues. In response, Justice Brennan insisted that deference does not 
apply to the jurisdictional inquiry, but only to the application of stat-
utes that an agency has been "entrusted to administer. " 140 As to de-
scriptive accuracy, Justice Scalia has the better of this disagreement.141 
In fact, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who had agreed with Justice 
Brennan, later found themselves unsuccessfully urging deference to the 
EEOC's view that Title VII applies outside the United States.142 On 
note f06, at 866 (arguing that for administrators "to decide the scope of their own 
authority ... violates the idea of separation of powers"); Sunstein, Interpreting, supra 
note 52, at 446 (admonishing that "foxes should not guard henhouses"); Sunstein, Con-
stitutionalism, supra note 4, at 467 (stating also that "foxes should not guard 
henhouses"). Professor Sunstein's most recent formulation is that Chevrorz should apply 
where the jurisdictional determination involves "one or a few cases," but not "when the 
issue is whether the agency's authority extends to a broad area of regulation, or to a 
large category of cases, except to the extent foat the answer to that question calls for 
determination of fact or policy." Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at 
2100. 
139. 487 U.S. 354 (1988). Justice Scalia's views were endorsed by Justice White, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 54 
(1990) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Scalia's "lucid concurrence" in Missis-
sippi Power & Light Co. and noting "that Chevron itself and several of our cases de-
cided since Chevron have deferred to agencies' determinations of matters that affect 
their own statutory jurisdiction"). 
140. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 
386 (1988) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). The major-
ity opinion did not address the agency's jurisdiction, and so had no need to consider 
Chevron's relevance to the issue. 
The District of Columbia Circ.uit has likewise raised but failed to resolve the ques-
tion of Chevron's application to agencies' jurisdictional determinations. See Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408. (D.C. Cir. 1990) (deciding case on other 
grounds; noting failure of Supreme Court to definitively resolve issue); New York Ship-
ping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing that deference "may ... be inappropriate" where agency is interpreting provisions 
"delimiting its jurisdiction"); Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 
839 F.2d 795, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting) (applying Chevron with full 
force because "the issue before us is not a question of the agency's power (in the sense 
of its jurisdictional reach) in which deference to the agency might be less justified"). 
141. Farina, supra note 4, at 463 n.53. Cases in which the Court has applied Chev-
ron to jurisdictional questions include K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 
291-93 (1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 1827-28 (Brennan, J., concurring), and United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). But see Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); .Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 
v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (rejecting, without .citation to Chevron, 
Federal Reserve Board's broad view of which financial institutions were "banks" within 
its jurisdiction). 
142. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., _ U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1245-46 
(1991) (Marshall, J.,"joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See also infra 
note 149 ( discussing reluctance to defer to agency's view of extraterrritorial application 
of statute it administers). 
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the merits, however, Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan are, perhaps, 
both right. 
Whatever it is that Chevron requires, it requires it equally with re-
gard to substantive and jurisdictional questions. Jurisdiction frequently 
hinges on a vague statutory term that the agency is charged with defin-
ing more specifically. Thus, Congress has delegated to the Ariny Corps 
of Engineers, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Reserve 
Board, and the Securities and Exci1ange Commission the authority to 
determine, respectively, who or what constitutes "waters of the United 
States,"143 an "employee,"144 a "bank,"145 and a "security,"146 under 
statutes that regulate waters, employees, banks, and securitie·s. The 
agency's expertise and accountability are as relevant to jurisdictional 
issues as they are to substantive ones. The agencies are best equipped 
to decide whether certain difficult to classify places, persons, entities, or 
financial instruments bear a sufficiently close resemblance to the para-
digmatic examples to justify inclusion in those categories. Although al-
lowing agencies to define their own jurisdiction may create opportuni-
ties for abuse and self-aggrandizement, 147 and one might worry that 
expertise and accountability will give way to self-interest in jurisdic-
tional decisions, the same threat is present in substantive agency deter-
minations. The consequences of giving agencies a free hand in jurisdic-
tional matters are not significantly different than those of letting the 
agency flesh out substantive requirements. Indeed, the jurisdictional 
regulations may be far less important. The usual industry complaints 
about being shackled by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration, for example, are in no way jurisdictional; they concern onerous 
substantive standards rather than an expansive understanding of what 
counts as a "place of employment."148 By the same token, undercutting 
143. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988), requires a 
permit from the Army Corps of Engineers for the discharge of any dredged or fill 
material into the "waters of the United States." The program has been controversial 
because the Corps defines such \Yaters to include swamps and wetlands. In upholding 
this expansive definition, the Court invoked Chevron and inquired only whether the 
Corps' broad view was "reasonable." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). 
144. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
145. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 
U.S. 361 (1986). 
146: Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 
U.S. 137 (1984). . 
147. See Sunstein, Interpreting, supra note 52, at 446 (observing that need for 
aggressive judicial review made especially "vivid by imagining cases involving such 
questions as ... whether agency jurisdiction extends to new or unforeseen areas"). 
148. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary establishes 
safety and health standards as necessary to ensure "safe or healthful employment and 
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a regulatory scheme by defining jurisdiction too narrowly-a common 
enough allegation in many areas of health and safety regulation-is 
generally not as significant a problem as understating substantive obli-
gations. The point is not that issues of jurisdiction are unimportant or 
pose no threat of a self-aggrandizing agency running amok. But, eff ec-
tive judicial review is no more essential to the integrity of the regula-
tory scheme here than elsewhere. There is, therefore, no reason to have 
different standards of deference for jurisdictional matters. 149 
On the other hand, Chevron does not require a court to accept an 
agency's view of the scope of its delegated authority, jurisdictional or 
.substantive. By definition, Congress cannot have left this determination 
to the agency. Even accepting a notion of delegation by ambiguity, it is 
the court that must determine the bounds of the ambiguity. Suppose, 
for example, Congress passes a statute directing the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to ensure that all. "passenger 
automobiles" are "safe. " 150 The key statutory terms are ambiguous, 
and the agency may have broad interpretive authority. Congress has 
probably left it to the NHTSA to decide whether to regulate, for exam-
ple, pick-up trucks used to carry farm produce. Nonetheless, Congress 
. has foreclosed NHTSA regulation of trains, buses, motorcycles, and 
bicycles151-these are outside the agency's authority. Some boundaries 
are inescapably established by statute and are, therefore, for the courts 
places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988). Each "employer" must comply 
with the standards and provide "a place of employment . . . -free from recognized 
hazards." Id. § 654(a). 
149. Concerns about agency overreaching, combined with the importance of juris-
dictional questions in particular settings, may inform a court's view as to whether Con-
gress has made the delegation necessary to trigger step two. For example, the courts 
have been appropriately wary about deferring to an agency's view that the statute it 
administers applies extraterritorially. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,_ U.S.-, 
111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235-36 (1991) (rejecting EEOC's conclusion that Title VII applies 
extraterritorially); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 
& n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting agency's view that statute authorized it to subpoena 
witnesses and documents outside United States). The refusal to defer in these cases is 
not the result of the issue being jurisdictional. Rather, it reflects the fact that it would 
be extraordinary for Congress to have delegated this decision to the agency. Particu-
larly in light of the historic presumption against extraterritorial application of federal 
statutes, Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949), Congress is presumed to 
have decided the matter, if only by its silence, and so the case is properly analyzed 
under step one. 
150. This invented statute owes something to, and raises some of the same ambigu-
ities as, H.L.A. Hart's hypothetical rule that no vehicle may be taken into the park. 
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 115 (1961). 
151. This is a fair statement even though a power-aggrandizing agency, backed up 
by a plain meaning judge equipped with a dictionary but otherwise working in a lin-
guistic and cultural vacuum, could conclude that each is an automobile that carries 
passengers. 
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to elucidate.152 The danger of Chevron is that it invites courts to ignore 
the fact that Congress decided some things because it did not decide 
everything.153 
Two interpretive questions are thus always left for the court. First, 
the court must determine that there has been a delegation. 154 Second, it 
must determine the scope of that delegation: "Determination of the ex-
tent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for 
the decision of him in whom authority is vested." 155 Thus, the agency, 
armed with this delegated authority, is not free to say that anything is 
a water of the United States, an employee, a bank, or a security. The 
court must ensure that the agency does not exceed its statutory author-
ity. One implicit "interpretation" within any legislative rule is that the 
rule is within the agency's authority. Were this interpretation "bind-
ing," an agency would always be able to pick itself up by its own boot-
straps and insulate itself from any meaningful judicial review and 
hence any need to comply with the statute. 
Suppose, for example, that the Army Corps of Engineers was to re-
quire a permit for the discharge of fill material into the sands of the 
Arizona desert. The Corps cites Chevron and United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc. 156 and insists that its interpretation of "wa-
ters of the United States"157 is binding. Any court would reject the 
Corps' position. The reason why can be put many ways: the intent of 
Congress is clear; this is a "pure issue of statutory. construction'';158 the 
152. This hypothetical statute has both a jurisdictional and a substantive ambigu-
ity, further illustrating that there should be no difference between the treatment of the 
two under Chevron. I have discussed the jurisdictional ambiguity (what is a passenger 
automobile?) in text, but the same point could have been made using the substantive 
ambiguity (what is safe?). Nor are these the only two categories. For example, this 
statute seems to leave it to the agency to decide whether "safety" should be achieved 
through performance standards, technological standards, or merely greater information 
disclosure· to consumers. But it does not allow the agency to say that in its view the 
market already ensures safe automobiles. The point is that in administering any regula-
tory scheme an agency must make a huge range of determinations that the statute does 
not fully settle regarding the scope, stringency, and type of regulation. Both the ration-
ale underlying Chevron and the dangers of taking it too far are present with regard to 
each type of determination. 
153. For a specific example, see infra note 195. 
154. Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deferring "to an 
agency's interpretation constitutes a judicial determination that Congress has dele-
gated the norm-elaboration function to the agency"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 
(1985). 
155. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944). · 
156. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); see supra note 143 (describing permit scheme for dis-
charge of fill into waters of United States). 
157. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (1988). 
158. For discussion of "pure questions," see infra notes 142-81 and accompanying 
text. 
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Corps has exceeded the zone of indeterminacy; the Corps has exceeded 
its delegated authority; its interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, and 
an abuse of discretion; the interpretation is unreasonable or inconsistent 
with any conceivable statutory purpose. Whatever the terminology, the 
point is the same. The court can say with confidence that Congress did 
not require permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material in the 
desert. In calling for deference, the Corps is implicitly arguing that 
Congress failed to decide when permits are required and left that deter-
mination to it. This claim is itself an interpretation of the statute, one 
to which the court owes Skidmore deference, but no more. 
This idea works in both directions. Suppose the Corps concludes that 
the statute unambiguously requires a permit for discharge of fill mate-
rial in wetlands, that wetlands are, by clear congressional mandate, 
"waters of the United States." Suppose further that the cou_rt finds the 
statute ambiguous; it could, but need not 1:>e, applied to wetlands. Wet-
lands had never crossed Congress' collective mind, or had and Congress 
decided the Corps should decide whether to include them in the permit 
program. Does the statute's ambiguity make the agericy's view that the 
statute is not ambiguous binding? Such ari argument would be incoher-
ent. The court concludes that there was a delegation and the determi-
nation of whether wetlands are waters, therefore, belongs in step two. 
That conclusion, i.e., whether the merits are step one or step two, is 
made within step one by definition. 159 
Justice Scalia thus is essentially correct that "there is no discernible 
line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's ex-
ceeding authorized application of its ·authority. To exceed authorized 
application is to exceed authority."160 This means, however, that Chev-
ron's step two applies to neither of these identical twins, not to both. 
Congress may have given an agency lots of room or almost none, but 
the boundaries are by definition set by Congress and hence for judicial 
identifica tion. 161 
159. Regarding what a court should do if an agency deemed its hands tied by what 
the court considers an ambiguous statute, see infra notes 189-99 and accompanying 
text. 
160. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 
381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing agency interpretations of statutes confining their jurisdiction are entitled to no 
deference). 
161. For an argument that allowing the agency to determine the boundaries of the 
delegation would violate the separation of powers, see Farina, supra note 4, at 487-88, 
497-98. As I read Professor Farina, her position and mine are wholly consistent. 
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B. "Pure Questions" of Statutory Interpretation 
Chevron has prompted a simmering dispute over whether an excep-
tion to its hands-off approach exists when a court addresses "a pure 
question of statutory construction." Writing for the Court in Cardoza-
Fonseca, 162 Justice Stevens rejected the agency's plea for Chevron def-
erence. The case presented "a pure question of statutory construction 
for the courts to decide ... [e]mploying traditional tools of statutory 
construction."163 Justice Scalia violently protested that this loose talk 
was an unprincipled retreat from Chevron. 164 Some lower courts have 
since held that the Chevron methodology is inapplicable to "pure ques-
tions of statutory interpretation."165 No such exception exists. 
The opinions using this phrase do not define precisely what a "pure 
question" is. One possible meaning is that a "pure question" is one that 
does not require the development of a factual record or the application 
of law to facts, as opposed to a factual question or mixed question of 
law and fact. 166 Justice Scalia takes this view, arguing that Chevron 
162. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
163. Id. at 446. Justice Brennan has also stated that in "pure question" cases "our 
first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory 
construction.'" NLRB v. United Food &-Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 
123 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.). See Sunstein, 
Interpreting, supra note 52, at 447 (arguing that "[c]ourts, not self-interested regula-
tors, should resolve statutory ambiguities involving pure questions of law"). But see 
Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 4, at 2096 (permitting deference 
"[e]ven in pure questions of law ... unless there is some independent reason for dis-
trusting the agency"). 
164. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454-55 (Scalia, J., concurring); see NLRB v. 
United Food & .Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).-
165. In Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 
108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court suggested that even were congressional intent 
unclear, it.would not proceed to step two in a "pure question" case. Because it could 
easily discern congressional intent in the case before it, however; it had no need to put 
that resolution to the test. See also Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United 
States, 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 
F.2d 587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1987); Miree Constr. Corp. v. Dole, 730 F. Supp. 385, 391 
n.14 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (stating that court "cannot defer to the agency's decision with 
regard to pure questions of law relating to statutory construction," although agency 
interpretation may still carry some weight), affd, 930 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1991). 
The Supreme Court has denied at least one petition for certiorari directly raising the 
question whether step two deference applies in pure question cases. Texas Apparel Co. 
v. United States, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990); see 58 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1989) 
(summarizing petition). 
166. E.g., International Union of United Mine Workers v. Federal Mine Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 840 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Anthony, supra note 48, at 
9, 21. Thus, in Cardoza-Fonseca Justice Stevens distinguished "[t]he narrow legal 
question whether the two standards are the same" from the "quite different ... ques-
tion of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply 
either or both standards to a particular set of facts." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 
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itself was a "pure question" case, since only the "abstract interpreta-
tion of the phrase ,'stationary source'" was at issue.167 The issue in 
Cardoza-Fonseca was undeniably a "pure question of statutory inter-
pretation" in this sense. The Court had to decide whether two phrases 
governing suspension of deportation meant t}:le same thing. It did not 
have to decide whether the statutory language applied to a particular 
alien. Clearly, this question did not turn on or even require reference to 
any facts. 
Legal issues this "pure," however, are few and far between. Statu-
tory interpretation usually requires some facts, even if they are only 
hypothetical. Chevron was not as "purely legal" as Cardoza-Fonseca. 
As Justice Scalia points out, it did not involve any factual disputes and 
did not turn on the facts. 168 Nonetheless, the dispute arose against the 
background of an undisputed set of hypothetical facts involving offset-
ting in~plant reductions of air pollution. Indeed, to say what a statute 
means is to describe its applicability to a particular set of facts. 169 Even 
if there were an exception for purely legal issues, such as that in Car-
doza-Fonseca, it would be an extraordinarily narrow exception. 170 Fi-
nally, the Court often defers in cases involving no factual issues.171 
448. 
167. Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
168. Id. 
169. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 (observing that ambiguous statute 
"can only be given meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication"); Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "[t]hose who apply the rule to partic-
ular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule"). See also HART, supra 
note 150, at 126 (describing how in applying rule to unanticipated facts "we shall have 
rendered more determinate our initial aim, and shall incidentally have settled a ques-
tion as to the meaning ... of a general word"). 
170. Professor Anthony points to cases concerning who is an "employee" under the 
labor laws as other examples of "pure questions." Anthony, supra note 48, at 10 (citing 
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)). The legal issues in these 
cases are not that pure; determining whether foremen are employees (the issue in 
Packard) obviously requires some factual understanding about what foremen do. Pro-
fessor Anthony contrasts Packard with NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 
111 ( 1944) ( determining whether newsboys are employees), implying that Hearst did 
not involve a purely legal question. Yet, whether foremen are employees turns on the 
facts just as much as whether newsboys are employees. The difference is that with 
regard to foremen the facts recur more frequently and are better known. 
Hearst did raise a threshold legal issue that was truly "pure," like that in Cardoza-
Fonseca: whether the common law definition of "employee" controls under the labor 
laws. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120-22. That question can be answered without defining 
"employee," just as the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca did not have to establish what the 
two phrases at issue meant in order to say that they did not mean. the same thing. 
171. For example, Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, _ U.S. -, 111 S. 
Ct. 1503 (1991), concerned whether a savings and loan association had realized a loss 
when it traded one set of participation interests in mortgages for another set with a 
lower face value. The statutory question was whether there had been a "sale or other 
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· The issue in Cardoza-Fonseca was "pure" in a second, more relevant 
way which better explains the Court's use of that term. It was "pure" 
in that Congress provided the answer. 172 The Court did not have to go 
beyond the usual legal materials to resolve it. The distinction is not 
between issues of law and fact, which does not seem to have much to 
do with Chevron. The distinction is between issues of law and policy, 
which is at the core of Chevron. Thus, a "pure question" is a Chevron 
step one question. 
This reading reconciles any tension between Chevron and Cardoza-
Fonseca. Both the majority and Justice Scalia agreed that Cardoza~ 
Fonseca was a step one case. Indeed, where the Court has used the 
"pure question" language173 it has equated the "pure question" with 
the "precise question at issue," a term which is in turn taken from 
Chevron's description of the step one inquiry. 174 Likewise, the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction" are what resolve "pure ques-
tions" under Cardoza-Fonseca175 and what decide step one cases under 
Chevron. 176 
A pure question is, then, a step one case; indeed, defining one by the 
other is tautological. There is no "exception" for pure questions of stat-
utory interpretation. In using that phrase, Justices Stevens and Bren-
nan were merely repeating precisely what Chevron says and what has 
never been in dispute. Where Congress has decided the issue, its deter-
mination, not the agency's, must prevail. This view of "pure questions" 
can in fact be seen in more recent opinions. In Dole v. United Steel-
disposition of property." 26 U.S.C. § lO0l(a) (1988). Under IRS regulations a realized 
loss occurs if there is an "exchange of property for other property differing materially 
either in kind or in extent." 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001-1 (1990). The Court upheld the regu-
lation as a "reasonable interpretation" of the statute that merited judicial deference. 
Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1508-09. This was a pure question of law in the sense of 
·involving no factual dispute; the Court made no reference to the facts of this or any 
case. Although the opinion did not cite Chevron or use the "pure question" language, it 
does belie the usual reading of Cardoza-Fonseca as abjuring deference where no facts 
are involved. 
172. It is in this sense that Packard is arguably a pure question of statutory inter-
pretation and Hearst is not. The usual way of reconciling these two decisions is that 
Packard raised a major issue of labor policy as to which Congress surely held views, 
whereas Hearst concerned an interstitial question that Congress probably never 
thought about. Anthony, supra note 48, at 1 0; Breyer, supra note 40, at 371-72. Pack-
ard thus presented a "pure" question not in the sense that it did not involve application 
of law to facts, but in the sense that Congress had resolved it. 
173. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(plurality opinion); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. 
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
175. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. 
176. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
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workers, 177 for example, Justice Scalia actually joined an opinion by 
Justice Brennan employing the "pure question" language.178 Similarly, 
in Sullivan v. Stroop, 179 the Court found that the statute unambigu-
ously confirmed the agency's interpretation, deciding the case under 
Chevron step one and not bothering to invoke the deference principle. 
The dissent argued that the statute unambiguously contradicted the 
agency's reading and quoted the "pure question" language.180 Thus, all 
the Justices181 treated this as a step one case. The dissent expressly 
equated such cases with "pure questions." There was no squabbling 
over whether Chevron applies to such questions. If the dispute over the 
pure question exception is ebbing, it is the result of the Justices' shared 
understanding that "pure questions" are nothing more or less than step 
one questions. They are "purely legal" questions for the courts, as op-
posed to the policy-based determinations made by agencies where Con-
gress has delegated lawmaking authority. While it is true, then, that a 
court must stay in step one when resolving pure questions of law, that 
is not an exception to Chevron but a restatement of its holding. 
Finally, to return to the themes of this Article, at least one "pure 
question" exists in every judicial review of agency action: the court 
must determine the scope of the agency's delegated authority. As dis-
cussed above, that is a matter that, by definition and at a minimum, 
Congress will have established. If when faced with a "pure question of 
statutory construction" the court did not defer, notwithstanding the 
most confounding ambiguity or the clearest delegation to the agency, 
that would indeed be quite an exception. It turns out, however, that 
there cannot be a "pure question" in the face of confounding ambiguity 
or clear delegation. 
177. 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
178. Id. at 35. 
179. _U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990). 
180. Id. at 2508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
181. All but one. Strangely, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, wrote a brief 
dissent saying that although he did not consider the case to be "quite as clear" as it 
was to Justice Blackmun in dissent, "I believe he has the better of the argument." Id. 
at 2510. Many would say that describes exactly the situation when Chevron's step two 
applies. See Silberman, supra note 48, at 826-27 (cautioning that merely being able to 
identify better of two readings does not keep court in step one). Justice Stevens's rela-
tion to his most-cited opinion is complicated. In addition to Stroop, compare Young v. 
Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (com-
plaining that "[t]he task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing 
an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference"), with Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. 
v. Primary Steel, Inc.,_ U.S._, 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2772, 2779 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of ignoring statutory ambiguity 
and failing to follow Chevron). 
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C. Chevron and Chenery 
In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 182 the Supreme Court established the fun-
damental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court can up-
hold an agency only on the basis of the rationale relied on by the 
agency itself. 183 Chevron may undermine this principle. In a step two 
case, where the agency is fr~e to do what it wishes, it might seem that 
the agency's particular rationale would not matter. In fact, however, 
the Chenery rule retains its vitality. 
I. Chenery and Agency Freedom of Movement 
One concern underlying the Chenery rule is that to uphold an agency 
action on a ground invented by Department of Justice lawyers or the 
court itself could lock the agency into a position that it had never in 
fact espoused and with which it disagrees. 184 This concern is present 
only if the court's ruling results in final and binding conclusions of law. 
If the conclusion of the court is, as in Chevron, that the agency was 
free to do what it did, but was and is also free to do the opposite, then 
the court is not limiting agency options. 
If this is the only concern underlying the Chenery rule, a court 
should uphold agency action under step two even if its view of the stat-
ute differs from the agency's. The agency then can reverse itself if it 
wishes. Because in most cases an agency will affirm its prior decision,185 
setting the agency's action aside would only lead to unnecessary delay 
and pointless additional procedures. Affirming the action still leaves the 
agency completely free to alter its position if it so chooses, so no harm 
is done. 
Indeed, that agencies need not worry about having their hands tied is 
demonstrated by a number of remarkable decisions in which courts 
have wriggled out of apparently dispositive contrary precedents by rein-
182. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
183. Id. at 87-88. 
184. Women Involved in Farm Economics v. Department of Agriculture, 876 F.2d 
994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Colloquy, Developments in Judicial Review with Em-
phasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 AoMIN. L.J. 113, 
140 (1990) (comment of Judge Stephen Williams). 
185. Schuck. and Elliott's data show that judicial reversal of an agency leads to a 
"major change" in the agency action forty percent of the time. Schuck & Elliott, supra 
note 3, at 1047-49, 1059-60. Even if this figure is correct (most would agree with 
Schuck and Elliott that it is surprisingly high), it still means that in 60% of the cases a 
reversed agency managed to do what it wanted anyway. That figure would be much 
higher in a subclass of cases where the agency was told that it could do just what it 
did, it need only say "we choose to" rather than "we have to." 
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terpreting them as Chevron step two cases. 186 Chevron's mystical pow-
ers are so great as to "alter the meaning of ... decisi<;>ns that were 
based on a broader notion of judicial review."187 Thus, prior decisions 
that would seem to bind the agency and raise exactly the danger Che-
nery guards against are reinterpreted as having accepted the agency's 
interpretation as "reasonable," perhaps even the "better" interpreta-
tion, but not one compelled by statute and so not one with which it is 
stuck.188 How much freer, then, will agencies be if their position is up-
186. For example, in Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of 
Laborers, 861 F:2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), the legal question was whether an 
employer could repudiate a prehire agreement it had negotiated with a union. The 
NLRB had initially ruled that such repudiation was an unfair labor practice, then 
switched its position, and finally returned to its original view. During the middle period, 
the Supreme Court had upheld the Board's view that unilateral repudiation did not 
violate the National Labor Relations Act. The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the 
Supreme Court precedents required that it reject the Board's new position. The major-
ity concluded that the Supreme Court had not independently construed the statute; 
rather, it had merely concluded that the Board's interpretation was reasonable and 
consistent with the NLRA and accordingly deferred to it. Id. at 1136. The opposite 
interpretation was equally reasonable and consistent with the NLRA. Each of the three 
dissents took a slightly different tack, but each seemed to view the Supreme Court 
decisions as constructrons of the statute and therefore binding. 
Other cases where reviewing courts have found that a previous court, unbeknownst to 
it, had merely deferred to the agency position as being one of many (including its 
opposite) within the zone of indeterminacy, include National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 
FERC, 900 F.2d 340, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1~90); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine 
Safety 4', Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d 773, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1990); and NRDC v. 
EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
A slightly different problem arises when the pre-Chevron decision rejected the 
agency's interpretation. In that setting, the anachronistic reading would treat the pre-
cedent as a step one case, thus clearly foreclosing any later shift by the agency. Lech-
mere, Inc. v. NLRB,_ U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), is an example. The Board 
found an employer had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to allow non-
employee union organizers on its property. The Court held this decision conflicted with 
the holding of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). It refused to 
defer treating Babcock & Wilcox as a decision about the meaning of the statute itself. 
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847-48. In dissent, Justices White and Blackmun argued that 
even if the majority's understanding of the rule announced in Babcock & Wilcox was 
correct, which they denied, that decision was_ inconsistent with modern principles of 
deference. The statute did not answer the question, so the Court should have de-
ferred-both in Babcock and in Lechmere. Id. at 850, 852-53. 
187. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d 
773, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
188. Twice recently the Supreme Court rejected agency interpretations that con-
flicted with previous interpretations upheld in pre-Chevron decisions. Maislin Indus., 
U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,_ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990); Califor-
nia v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). These decisions do not state that the later, invalid 
interpretation was within the zone of indeterminacy that would have existed but for the 
prior ruling. Rather, they strike down interpretations as being simply inconsistent with 
the statute. See also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, _ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) 
(rejecting agency interpretation consistent with previous interpretation rejected in pre-
Chevron decision). 
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held under step two and with a citation to Chevron? 
2. Chenery' s Continued Importance 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if an agency considers its interpreta-
tion compelled, and the court concludes that it is merely permissible, 
the court should remand, not affirm. Even though the court's decision 
will not tie the agency's hands, the agency must rethink its decision in 
light of its actual freedol]l of movement. 
The point is illustrated by a recent case arising under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).189 RCRA requires federal 
agencies to buy recycled products. 190 This obligation is triggered when 
EPA designates a product that is available in recycled form and issues 
regulations to guide federal agencies in procuring it. 191 Agencies need 
not purchase designated recycled products if they are available "only at 
an unreasonable price."192 EPA's guidelines for recycled paper prod-
ucts define "unreasonable" as anything more than the price for compa-
rable virgin paper. 193 
In National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly,194 a coalition of re-
cyclers and an environmental organization unsuccessfully challenged 
this definition of "unreasonable price." The court's analysis was pure 
Chevron. Congress entrusted RCRA's administration to EPA; "unrea-
sonable" is an inherently ambiguous term; the language, structure, and 
history -of the RCRA are not completely dispositive as to its meaning; 
therefore, because EPA's reading is "consistent with the Act's overall 
purpose," the court must "accede" to it. 195 The complication is that 
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). 
190. Id. § 6962(c)(l). Congress reasoned that by purchasing recycled products the 
government would both lead by example and stimulate the market for recovered. mater-
ials. H. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6289; S. REP. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976). 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6962(e) (1988). 
192. Id. 
193. 40 C.F.R. § 250.21 (1991). 
194. 884 F.2d 1431, reh'g denied, 890 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The author was 
counsel for one of the petitioners. 
195. Id. at 1435-37. The court's approach illustrates the threat that a court will 
find utter ambiguity where the statute in fact provides some guidance. Accepting that 
Congress left it to the agency to flesh out exactly what constituted an "unreasonable" 
price does not mean that this is a step two case, plain and simple. That the term will 
support many readings does not mean that it will support any. A court is singularly ill-
equipped to say whether a price of fifty cents per ream more for recycled than virgin 
paper is "unreasonable," but the term is not devoid of judicially interpretable meaning. 
The question before the court was not the meaning of the phrase "unreasonable price," 
but whether Congress at least meant it to include some price premium over the lowest-
priced virgin paper. As Judge Wald wrote in dissent, "the case really turns on the 
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although the court treated this as a step two case, the agency saw it as 
a step one case. EPA did not think that it was filling an explicit or 
implicit gap; it thought that it was interpreting a statutory term consis-
tent with Congress' actual determination of the point at issue. EPA 
declined to endorse price preferences in its guidelines on the ground 
that it thought Congress had foreclosed that option; "RCRA Section 
6002 does not provide explicit authority to EPA to authorize or recom-
mend payment of a price preference."196 
The basic premise of Chevron loses all validity if the court goes to 
step two where the agency stopped at step one. Had EPA known, for 
example, that Congress had left it room either to endorse or reject a 
price preference, as the court held, it might not have written the same 
rule. The reason EPA actually gave for not endorsing a price prefer-
ence is that Congress had forbidden it. EPA considered the scope of its 
authority narrower than the court did. Where the agency purported to 
find statutory clarity, the court found ambiguity. It is sjlly to "defer" to 
the agency's concl:usion when its premise has been rejected.197 Indeed, 
narrower question of whether Congress intended to authorize the [EPA] ... to recom-
mend that federal procurement agencies ... p~rsue a strategy that involves never pay-
ing any premium over the lowest bid price for such items." Id. at 1438 (Wald, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). That narrower question is a step one, judicial inquiry 
notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term "unreasonable." The Supreme Court, in an 
unrelated case, has since confirmed that the National Recycling Coah'tion court's ap-
proach was mistaken. It quite .correctly refused to hide behind Chevron in setting aside 
the Interstate Commerce Commission's view of an "unreasonable practice." Maislin 
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., _ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990); id. at 
2771 (Scalia, J., concurring). The issue is also comparable to that in Cardoza-Fonseca. 
There the Court acknowledged that, for example, fleshing out the meaning of "well-
founded fear of persecution" in concrete cases against specific facts would involve 
agency discretion and place a case within step two. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 448 (1987). That did not mean that any interpretive question about the statutory 
term is left to the agency. The Court could independently decide whether Congress 
meant to equate a ''well-founded fear of persecution," 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(42) (1988), 
with proof that it was "more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion," INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). Even with a highly ambiguous term, then, 
the Court must determine what it "cannot mean, and some of what it must mean." 
Monaghan, supra note 48, at 27; 
196. EPA, Guideline for Recovered Material Content in Paper Products Procured 
by the Federal Government, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,559 (1989). See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,080 
(1985). One might argue that EPA did not actually see its hands as tied but was 
merely swayed by the lack of "explicit authority." I do not think this is the case, but 
even ifit were, the general proposition remains unchanged and this decision just be-
comes a weak illustration. 
197. The District of Columbia Circuit is in good company. The Supreme Court 
seemed to do the same thing in Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 276 (1982). In other 
cases, the District of Columbia Circuit has correctly remanded where the agency's ra-
tionale was that its hands were tied and the court disagreed. See, e.g., American Petro-
leum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Kamargo Corp. v. FERC, 852 
F.2d 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v .. ICC, 826 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 
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absent express delegation of interpretive authority, whenever an agency 
says, explicitly or implicitly, "we think Congress intended ... ," its 
conclusion must be reviewed under step one. What Congress intended 
is a question for the courts. It may be that the agency is wrong, and 
Congress had no intent, but that is for the court to decide. This is not 
just a point about the different players' proper roles. This approach is 
necessary to keep the agency honest. Especially given the accountabil-
ity rationale of Chevron, an agency should not be able to hide from its 
critics by saying that its hands are tied when they are not. 
Where an agency underestimates its freedom of movement, the 
proper relief is to remand to the agency, not to uphold the agency ac-
tion. This reflects not only standard principles of administrative law 
settled since Chenery,198 which was itself a case of this sort,199 but also 
the basic theory of Chevron, which is that agencies should be left free 
to make policy determinations where Congress has not. Chevron's dis-
tinction between step one and step two situations thus confirms the im-
portance of upholding an agency only on the basis of its. articulated 
rationale. The court should allow, or force, the agency to operate with 
the flexibility and responsiveness that, under Chevron, are its strengths. 
D. A Different Metaphor for Agency "Interpretations" 
Justice Stevens' opinion in Chevron speaks of agencies "filling gaps" 
left by Congress.200 Although this is the dominant metaphor, it is mis-
leading. It implies that agencies complete a line only partly sketched by 
Congress. But agencies do not operate on the same horizontal plane as 
Congress. A better metaphor would be vertical rather than horizontal 
and so capture the role of agencies in adding specificity to the genera-
lized statements of Congress. One possibility is the scheme of biological 
classification. In its broadest enactments, Congress has identified the 
1987). 
198. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88, 95 (1943); see International Bhd. 
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
Judge Wald's dissent makes this point: "[E]ven if Congress did not compel the EPA 
to recommend that procurement agencies be allowed to give some price preference to 
recycled goods, I believe that the agency's mistaken conclusion that Congress forbade 
it to do so is itself a sufficient basis on which to overturn the challenged rule." National 
Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 884 F.2d 1431, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
199. In Chenery, the SEC initially based its decision on its reading of judicial pre-
cedent. The Court held that the SEC had misread the cases, which did not in fact 
condemn the stock purchases rejected by the SEC. The Court remanded for the agency 
to have another crack at the case, now fully informed as to its freedom of movement. 
Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87-88. 
200. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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kingdom and nothing else. Congress occasionally gets down to the spe-
cies level,201 but that task is generally left for agencies. Under this met-
aphor, the courts' role is to ensure that as the agency becomes more 
specific it remains within the larger boundaries established by 
Congress. 
Consider Chevron in this regard. Congress imposed stringent require-
ments on new sources in dirty-air areas but left room for arguing about 
what counted as a new source. As Justice Stevens states, the difficulty 
was that Congress had not balanced the conflicting interests "at the 
level of specificity presented by this case."202 What is often overlooked 
is that even if Congress had legislated at "the level of specificity 
presented by this case" there still would have been another case in 
which further refinement was necessaty. Suppose the statute had stated 
that new source requirements "shall not apply to any new, discrete 
emissions unit from which do not exceed prior reductions from another 
discrete emissions unit within the same plant or facility." That is the 
bubble policy as approved in Chevron. Yet it leaves numerous questions 
at the next level of specificity. How recent must the compensating re-
ductions have been? Must they have been of the same pollutant? The 
same or a more dangerous pollutant? What sort of geographical, physi-
cal, or business link must there be for the bubbling sources to be part 
of the same "plant or facility?" Can prior reductions offset new emis-
sions if the reductions were legally mandated? The •answers to these 
questions are critical to the actual implementation of the bubble policy, 
and EPA's regulations do address them.203 But the questions do not 
indicate "gaps" in the hypothetical statutory language. Rather, they 
reflect increasingly specific questions of a sort inescapable in the appli-
cation of any. statutory provisions. 
The advantage of the metaphor of biological classification is that it 
reminds us of the. respective roles of Congress, courts, and agencies. 
The gap-filling metaphor implies that because Congress has said noth-
ing, i.e., left a gap, the agency must make the decision, and there is 
little for a court to do other than to make sure th,e agency is not being 
irrational. It also suggests that the agency can reach whatever Con-
201. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 
2399 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2399. 
202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
203. For example, any reduction in the prior five years counts against new emis-
sions. 40 C.F.R. § 52.24(f)(6)(ii)(a) (1991). The Court might be surprised that the 
bubble policy, which in most descriptions involves essentially simultaneous offsetting 
reductions and increases, is applied so loosely. Yet under Chevron the five-year rule 
would be hard to attack, even under the hypothetical statutory language set out in text. 
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gress has left alon~. The biological classification metaphor, in contrast, 
implies that Congress always has said something and reminds us that 
an agency ca,nnot reach what Congress has not. The statute may iden-
tify only the broadest outlines, but it always limits the agency's author-
ity to some extent. The role of the court is to ensure that as the agency 
spells things out with increasing specificity it stays within the bounda-
ries established by Congress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Chevron is generally perceived as a "landmark"204 or "watershed" 
decision205 that "was intended to be a sea change in the way the courts 
reviewed agency decisions."206 The decision would indeed be a 
landmark if it required courts to abandon to administrative agencies 
their traditional task of interpreting statutes. On the contrary, the au-
thor suggests that Chevron's modest, citation-laden opinion is consis-
tent with the rather less· dramatic import of its holding. Chevron 
merely refines longstanding principles most evident in the distinction 
between standards for judicial review of interpretive and legislative 
rules. An agency's view as to what Congres~ meant is entitled to Skid-
more deference, but no more. An agency's decision within the sphere of 
delegated authority binds the courts. Congress never implicitly dele-
gates the authority to make binding determinations of what Congress 
had ip. mind; that interpretive task remains for the courts. Congress 
does and can delegate the authority to make binding rules where it has 
not made them. That legislative task must be left to the agencies. 
The objection to this scheme is, of course, that distinguishing legisla-
tion from interpretation is impossible. Undeniably, any "interpretation" 
of a statute that goes beyond a literal repetition of its terms is a sort of 
legislative undertaking. This is to some extent a problem for a different 
article, and more a law professor's pr.oblem than a judge's problem, as 
shown by the continued vitality of the arguably meaningless distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules.207 But even accepting the va-
204. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 3, at 1023; Silberman, supra note 48, at 822. 
205. Starr, supra note 4, at 283. 
206. Colloquy, supra note 184, at 139 (comment of Cornish Hitchcock). 
207. The overlap of interpretation and legislation is clear but also irrelevant where 
Congress expressly gives an agency binding interpretive authority. See supra notes 26-
28, 123 and accompanying text (stating that when Congress specifically instructs 
agency to define statutory term, such rules will be deemed legislative). If Congress 
leaves it to the agency to elaborate on the meaning of a statutory term, the line be-
tween interpretation and lawmaking is extremely fine and perhaps nonexistent. The 
express delegation places these situations in step two, however, so the haziness of the 
distinction does not matter. · · 
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lidity of this objection, courts must to the fullest extent possible search 
for and implement statutory meanings. To the extent Congress has 
made a decision or even just pointed the way, its decision must be 
respected, and it is the courts' role to ensure that it is. Interpretation, 
that is, figuring out what it is Congress said-even if it is merely that 
the agency is to decide-is always up to the judiciary. 
The Chevron controversy parallels the debate over when, and to what 
extent, judicial review of agency action is precluded because the deci-
sion has been committed to agency discretion.208 This exception to the 
general rule that review is available applies only when there is "no law 
to apply. "209 A Chevron step two case is, in a sense, one in which there 
is "no law to apply." Yet the courts have by and large been careful to 
keep the committed-to-agency-discretion exception confined to narrow 
bounds. Even where a decision is largely discretionary, there is still in 
many respects "law to apply"-the decision may be arbitrary, uncon-
stitutional, procedurally defective, and so on.210 The court must be 
careful to determine just what has been committed to agency discre-
tion. Similarly, in interpreting statutes, the court must not assume that 
the entire interpretive task has been handed over to the agency. Rather, 
it must make a searching inquiry into the boundaries of agency discre-
tion and delegated authority. The court must enforce and adhere to all 
the law there is to apply. 
208. 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (1988). 
209. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 401 (1971). 
210. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Review of Agency Inaction after Heckler v. 
Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 653 (1985) (insisting that notwithstanding Supreme 
Court's presumption against reviewability of agency nonenforcement decisions there re-
main numerous grounds for judicial review of agency inaction). 
